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INTRODUCTION
After witnessing the effects of a large-scale chemical attack in
Japan in 1995,' the international community's attention turned to the
realities of the new era of "super-terrorism."2 On March 20, 1995, a
I. See SUPER TERRORISM: BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND NUCLEAR x (Yonah
Alexander & Milton Hoenig eds., 2001) [hereinafter SUPER TERRORISM] (stating
that the Tokyo incident's greatest significance was its demonstration of the
potential use of chemical weapons against states by non-state organizations).
2. See id. at ix-x (defining super-terrorism as the use of weapons of mass
destruction, i.e., biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons). This Comment
focuses on biological and chemical weapons because they are more accessible than
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religious cult released Sarin,3 a lethal nerve gas, in a crowded Tokyo
subway train during the morning rush hour.4 This form of terrorism
resulted in twelve casualties and over five thousand injuries, but
experts recognize that a slightly greater concentration of Sarin would
have lead to a much higher casualty rate.5 The Tokyo subway
incident exposed both the vulnerability of nations to such acts of
terrorism, and the enormity of the danger that such acts pose.6 It also
nuclear weapons, and therefore more likely to be used. See Joseph F. Pilat, The
Bioterrorism Threat: Technological and Political Considerations, in SUPER
TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 66. Today, many terrorist organizations prefer super-
terrorism to traditional methods of terrorism, such as explosives. See Gilmore
Commission First Annual Report, Reasons and Rationales Behind Potential CBRN
Terrorism, in SUPER TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 12, 15 [hereinafter Gilmore].
Biological and chemical weapons are relatively easy to disperse, and therefore
cause mass casualties. See id. at 14-15. For example, releasing 1,000 kilograms of
the nerve gas Sarin in open air would kill approximately 10,000 people. See id.
Terrorists may also use biological or chemical weapons as an effective means of
sabotaging a nation's economy, creating a sense of fear among its citizens, and
initiating a loss of public confidence. See JEFFREY D. SIMON, TERRORISTS AND THE
POTENTIAL USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES 8-9
(1989). For example, in 1988, the Chilean economy suffered immensely when
traces of cyanide were found in Chilean grapes, compelling the United States to
recall all Chilean fruit for several weeks. See id. More recently, the 2001 anthrax
attacks in the United States caused several federal government buildings to shut
down for several days or weeks, and severely disrupted the U.S. Postal Service.
See Avram Goldstein & Michael Powell, Anthrax in Five More D.C. Buildings;
Officials Troubled by Infection of N.J. Woman Who Doesn't Work in a Mailroom,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2001, at Al (reporting the discovery of anthrax spores in
mailroom facilities of government buildings); see also Ellen Nakashima,
Postmaster Asks Senate for Bailout of $5 Billion; Congress Reluctant to Cover
Losses, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001 (reporting that the anthrax-related sanitation of
mailroom facilities and vaccination of postal employees will cost billions of
dollars).
3. See Gilmore, supra note 2, at x, 15 (describing Sarin as "highly toxic,
volatile, and relatively easy to manufacture").
4. See SUPER TERRORISM, supra note 1, at x (recounting the Tokyo subway
incident).
5. See id. (discussing the consequences of a chemical assault on an
unsuspecting civilian population); see also Biological and Chemical Weapons
Research Act, S. 1764, 107th Cong. (2001) § 2(2)(A) (relating the events and
consequences of the Tokyo attack).
6. See SUPER TERRORISM, supra note 1, at x (indicating that chemical
terrorism results in high fatality rates and injuries). Experts say that the agents or
chemicals most likely to be used as weapons are smallpox, anthrax, botulism, and
plague. See World Health Organization, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding
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galvanized some nations to increase their efforts at taking preventive
and responsive countermeasures in the event of a chemical or
biological attack within their borders.7
The United States, a world leader in science and technology, has
the greatest capacity to finance the research and development
necessary for producing vaccines and drugs that counter chemical
and biological agents.8 Since 1995, the United States has devised
medical counterterrorism initiatives.9  These efforts increased
recently"° following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," and
the Deliberate Use of Biological Agents and Chemicals as Weapons, at
http://www.who.int/emc/questions.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). Smallpox poses
the most serious global bioterrorism threat due to its high transmissibility and
fatality rates. See Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, Smallpox Fact Sheet,
at http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/agents/agentsmallpox.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
7. See Presidential Decision Directive No. 39, U.S. Policy on
Counterterrorism (demonstrating renewed U.S. efforts and strategies to combat
terrorism after the chemical attack in the Tokyo subway), at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). Another
mobilizing factor included the discovery, in 1995, of new documents revealing that
Iraq had a more enhanced biological weapons system than initially suspected. See
Donald A. Henderson, Bioterrorism: Our Front Line Response Evaluating U.S.
Public Health and Medical Readiness, in SUPER TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 106.
Moreover, in the 1990s, the international community realized the scope and
capacity of Russia's biological weapons program after senior Russian officials
defected. See id.
8. See Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of
Innovation. TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 372 (2000) (comparing
the research and development ("R&D") expenditure of the developed world-
slightly over two percent of GDP-to the R&D expenditure of the United States-
two and eight tenths percent of its GDP); see also Office of Global Health Affairs,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Global Health Core Messages
[hereinafter Global Health Core Messages] (stating that the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services is a "recognized leader in health research") at
http://www.globalhealth.gov/quotes.shtml (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
9. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-201, §§ 1411-1415, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996) (describing the development and
coordination of an emergency response program for public health emergencies
involving biological or chemical weapons).
10. See Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris, Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen,
Ottilie Lundgren, and Lisa J. Raines Biological and Chemical Weapons Research
Act, S. 1764, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing incentives to pharmaceutical
companies to increase the research and development of drugs that prevent and treat
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the subsequent bioterrorist activities. 12 The dissemination of anthrax 3
spores through the U.S. mail system demonstrated the ease and
effectiveness of utilizing biological agents as lethal weapons. 4 In
response to bioterrorism, the U.S. government is encouraging the
pharmaceutical industry to invent and improve medical products that
combat biological warfare. 5
The United States has been the target of bioterrorism since
September 11, 2001, 6 but terrorists have targeted many other
illnesses resulting from biological or chemical attacks); see also Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act of 2001, S. 1765, 107th Cong. sec. 404 (2001) (proposing to
accelerate research and development of medical countermeasures to super-
terrorism).
I. See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked, President Vows to Exact
Punishment for 'Evil', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al (describing the sequence
of events on September 11, 2001, resulting from the hijacking of U.S. airplanes
and their ensuing crashes into the World Trade Center towers in New York City
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.).
12. See Michael Powell & Ceci Connolly, Experts Warn Bioterrorism Could
Expand; N.Y Hospital Worker Dies of Anthrax, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at AI
(reporting on the increase of fatalities from exposure to anthrax spores throughout
the United States and the fear of expansion of bioterrorism).
13. See World Health Organization, Anthrax Fact Sheet No. 264, (describing
anthrax as a bacterium agent that humans can acquire from contaminated food,
through airborne spores, or through cutaneous contact with spores) at
http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact264.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); see also
Gilmore, supra note 2, at 14 (indicating that the use of anthrax as a biological
weapon can be costly because turning the spores into a powder form requires
expensive equipment); see also Joshua Lederberg, The Diversity of Bio Weapons,
in SUPER TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that anthrax is more lethal when
the spores are disseminated by aerosols (i.e., aerosol cans, crop dusters) and are
inhaled by humans).
14. See David Brown, Canadian Study Shows Anthrax's Easy Spread: One
Letter Could Cause Many Deaths, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at A27 (discussing
the results of a study which showed that small particles of anthrax spores-three to
ten microns in diameter-could become airborne and spread within ten minutes
after opening a letter, and a high dosage could be lethal).
15. See S. 1764, secs. 6, 8-9 (granting federal tax incentives, two-year patent
term extensions for inventions that counter biological and chemical agents,
exclusive licensing of certain patented products, and protection against liability
with respect to products that combat biological or chemical terrorism).
16. See Powell & Connolly, supra note 12, at Al (reporting on one of a series
of anthrax-related fatalities in the United States since the beginning of a wave of
bioterrorism after September 11, 2001).
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countries in the past.17 If a developing country is the target of such an
attack, however, it would not likely have the financial resources to
purchase therapeutic drugs at full price. 8 Such a case would raise
important legal issues regarding intellectual property rights. Under
the U.S. Patent Act, 9 pharmaceutical companies have certain
exclusive rights with regard to their patents.20 The companies are
neither required to sell therapeutic drugs at a discount, nor to license
drug patents to a third party who can manufacture and sell the drugs
at more affordable prices.21
This Comment analyzes the impact on global counterterrorism
efforts if Congress amends U.S. patent law to permit compulsory
licensing of patents for health-related inventions. Part I briefly
outlines the historical debate between developed and developing
countries with respect to patent rights, and discusses U.S. policy on
patent rights and compulsory licensing.22 This section also discusses
the challenges confronting the U.S. government regarding its policy
on patent protection in the wake of the recent bioterrorist attacks on
the nation, and examines pending U.S. legislation regarding
17. See supra notes 2, 4, 5 and accompanying text (describing the use of
biological agents to poison Chilean grapes in 1988, and the chemical attack
incident in Japan in 1995); see also SIMON, supra note 2, at 9 (describing an
attempt by Palestinian extremists to sabotage the Israeli economy by injecting
mercury into Israeli oranges in 1978).
18. Cf James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS
Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 734 (2001) (discussing the
inability of millions of HIV/AIDS patients in developing countries, particularly in
Sub-Saharan Africa, to afford HIV/AIDS treatment drugs).
19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2001).
20. See id. § 271(a) (providing that any unauthorized fabrication, use, sale, or
importation into the United States of any patented invention during its patent term
constitutes patent infringement); see also ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW
ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 14 (1999) (explaining that U.S. patent law grants a
patent owner the exclusive right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import a
patented invention for a twenty-year period).
21. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (lacking any provision that would compel
a patent holder to license a patent to a private third party).
22. See discussion infra Parts I.A, 1.B (comparing developing and developed
countries' perspectives on the issue of compulsory licensing and the balancing of
social and commercial interests in the TRIPS Agreement).
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compulsory licensing.23 Part II assesses the problems under the
compulsory licensing framework of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement"), a
multilateral accord on intellectual property rights,24 and it analyzes
the provisions of pending U.S. compulsory licensing bills.25 This
section also evaluates the potential impact of U.S. compulsory
licensing legislation on the global availability of health-related
products that counter biological and chemical agents, as well as the
potential impact on medical research and development.26 Finally,
Part III of this Comment argues that combating super-terrorism will
require global cooperation, which can only be achieved through
increased flexibility in U.S. policy on patent rights.27 Specifically,
this Comment recommends that the World Trade Organization
("WTO") promote public health over commercial interests, and that
the U.S. Congress amend U.S. patent law to incorporate compulsory
licensing provisions.28
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON COMPULSORY LICENSING
In the past decade, developed and developing countries have hotly
debated the highly contentious issue of compulsory licensing.29
Compulsory licensing is generally defined as the granting of a
license by a government to a third party to use a patent without the
23. See discussion infra Parts IC, I.D (discussing the U.S. predicament arising
from the threat of bioterrorism and the U.S. compulsory licensing bills).
24. See discussion infra Part II.A.
25. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
26. See discussion infra Part II.C.
27. See discussion infra Part III (demonstrating the need for global cooperation
and response preparedness to combat super-terrorism).
28. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.D.
29. See Amy E. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine:
Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433,
2464 (1995) (presenting the differing views of developed and developing countries
on the issue of international intellectual property rights).
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authorization of the patent holder.3" The patentee receives royalty
fees in return for issuance of the license.31 In the pharmaceutical
context, compulsory licensing enables a government to license
patented drugs to generic manufacturers without the patent holder's
consent.3 2 The goal of compulsory licensing for prescription drugs is
to increase the supply of the drugs, and thereby reduce their prices
through increased market competition by generic drug companies. 33
Global access to generic drugs through compulsory licensing is
particularly vital in the wake of recent bioterrorist attacks in the
United States in October 2001.34
1. Perspective of Developed Countries
Many developed countries and the brand-name pharmaceutical
industry oppose compulsory licensing because a weak intellectual
property regime in foreign countries undermines patent holders'
rights and reduces amounts spent on research and development
("R&D").35 Opponents of compulsory licensing contend that drug
research is costly and time-consuming, and that a high degree of
economic risk is associated with the process.36 Pharmaceutical
30. See Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access to Essential
Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South Africa
Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 138 (2001) (explaining the concept of
compulsory licensing).
31. See id. (stating that under a compulsory licensing scheme, the patent holder
is entitled to reasonable compensation for an amount pre-determined by the
government granting the license).
32. See id. (defining compulsory licensing as the process of "[allowing] regular
licensure grants to a third party that will manufacture a drug still under patent").
33. See id. at 142 (indicating that compulsory licensing is beneficial for
increasing market competition and thereby reducing prices of pharmaceuticals).
34. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (describing the medical and
political repercussions of the recent anthrax attacks in the United States).
35. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 2469; see also Consumer Project on
Technology, Compulsory Licensing of Essential Medical Technologies (explaining
that the United States and the European Union, as a result of heavy lobbying by
large pharmaceutical companies, have increased trade pressures against
compulsory licensing of drugs) at http://lists.essential.org/1999/info-policy-
notes/msgOOOO.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
36. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Why Do
Medicines Cost So Much? [hereinafter Why Do Medicines Cost So Much?]
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companies rely on sales revenues to recoup their losses from past
R&D efforts and apply them toward continuing R&D.37 According to
the pharmaceutical industry, only a small number of highly
successful products generate the majority of the industry's profits.38
Therefore, strong patent protection for these products is crucial for
financing future R&D.3 9
Opponents of compulsory licensing also argue that the absence of
a strong intellectual property rights regime discourages investments
in pharmaceutical firms, and thereby deters R&D.4" According to this
theory, investors infuse capital in companies in anticipation of a
sufficient rate of return on their investments.4' Patent law provides
the economic incentive to invest in drug research by ensuring that
pharmaceutical patent holders have exclusive patent rights for twenty
years from the date of filing an application, which gives them a
market advantage during that time period.42 However, if investors
(claiming that marketing one successful drug costs pharmaceutical companies
approximately $500 million, that only five out of 5,000 compounds that are
discovered by the pharmaceutical industry are sufficiently effective for human
testing, and that only one out of 5,000 is marketable for patient use) at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/questions/whycostmuch.
phtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
37. See Singham, supra note 8, at 373-74 (noting that pharmaceutical
companies in the United States generally invest between sixteen percent and
twenty and eight tenths percent of their sales revenue in research and
development).
38. See id. (citing a study that reveals that ten percent of marketable drugs
generate fifty-five percent of the pharmaceutical industry's profits).
39. See id. at 373 (arguing that patent protection is more essential for the
pharmaceutical industry than other industries due to the higher costs and risks
associated with pharmaceutical research); see also Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory
Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable Solution to an
Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 304 (1994) (attributing the financial
growth of the pharmaceutical industry to exclusivity provided by patent law).
40. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The
Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 357-58 (1993) (alleging that compulsory
licensing has the negative effect of reducing the financial security and
attractiveness of investing in pharmaceutical companies).
41. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 2469 (supporting the theory that a strong
patent regime promotes investment by assuring investors sufficient returns from
successful products).
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (specifying the duration of a patent term); see
also Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the
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perceive that compulsory licensing will increase competition and
lower industry profits, they would likely refrain from investing in the
R&D of innovative pharmaceutical products. 43 This, in turn, would
have a negative impact on global health care.4
Finally, critics conclude that compulsory licensing is detrimental
to the social and economic welfare of developing nations with weak
patent protection systems. 45 They claim that developed countries are
reluctant to export products and technologies to such countries, for
which technological and industrial advancement is an essential
component of national prosperity. 46 For corroboration of this theory,
analysts cite to studies that reveal a strong correlation between the
infusion of new technology into the domestic market of a country
and economic and social progress.47
In summary, developed countries advance the following
arguments against compulsory licensing: (1) strong patent protection
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference 4 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished paper, on file with
Quaker United Nations Office - Geneva) (analyzing the benefits of a strong
intellectual property regime) at
http://hostings.diplomacy.edu/quaker/new/doc/OP7%20Abbottl.pdf (last visited
Sept. 5, 2002).
43. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 2469 (recognizing the economic reality of
market incentives and profit maximization goals).
44. See Singham, supra note 8, at 374 (correlating weak patent protection with
a reduction in research for life saving drugs, due to a hampering of the
pharmaceutical industry's ability to recover high research costs).
45. See id. at 375 (linking strong intellectual property protection to economic
prosperity through increased foreign direct investment). But see Abbott, supra note
42, at 8 (challenging the notion that strong patent protection encourages a higher
level of direct foreign investment in developing countries).
46. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 2469 (attributing foreign investment in
developing countries to the degree of investment security provided by their patent
regime); see also Singham, supra note 8, at 375 (linking strong intellectual
property protection to greater technological development and economic growth).
For example, Mexico and South Korea, which have strong patent systems, have the
greatest technological development among developing countries. See id. at 378.
47. See Singham, supra note 8, at 375-76 (recognizing a relationship between
technological advancement and economic and social prosperity). Studies of
American economic growth have related high economic output to increased
research and technology. See id. Also, commentators argue that weak patent
protection depletes a country's intellectual resources by reducing incentives to
innovate, which drives local scientists and engineers from developing countries to
countries with stronger patent systems. See id. at 378-79.
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stimulates future innovations of medical products;48 (2) patents
encourage capital investment in pharmaceutical companies; 49 and (3)
strong patent regimes attract direct foreign investment, thereby
benefiting developing nations in the long term." WTO Members
from developed countries exert economic and political pressure on
developing Members to limit their use of compulsory licensing.5
They allege that the developing countries that are the primary
sources for low-cost generics (i.e., Brazil and India) engage in
compulsory licensing to promote commercial rather than public
health interests.5
48. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
weak patent protection jeopardizes the pharmaceutical industry's ability to engage
in future R&D).
49. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (posing the argument that a
weak intellectual property regime reduces investment in pharmaceutical enterprises
and thereby reduces research and development of essential pharmaceutical
products).
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (presenting the argument that
a strong intellectual property regime increases the influx of foreign investments
and innovative technologies, which lead to economic and social development).
51. See, e.g., Julie S. Park, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents in the Global Arena:
Thailand's Struggle Between Progress and Protectionism, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 121, 142-45 (1993) (discussing the United States' use of trade sanctions to
compel Thailand to incorporate more aggressive patent protection in its patent
law); see also Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the
TRIPs Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 954
(2000) (stating that the United States threatened to impose trade sanctions on South
Africa in response to the South African government's enactment of a compulsory
licensing law).
52. See Joseph Kahn, Trade Talks Hinge on Finesse of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2001, at A6 (reporting that United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
Zoellick is trying to limit the use of the Brazilian and Indian generic
pharmaceutical markets by offering patent exemptions to least developed African
countries facing public health pandemics); see also Letter from James Love,
Director of Consumer Project on Technology, to USTR Zoellick regarding WTO
Patent discussions [hereinafter Letter to USTR Zoellick] (criticizing the United
States' continuous attempt to discredit the position held by Brazil and India on
compulsory licensing), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/200 1-
November/002379.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
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2. Perspective of Developing Countries
Many developing countries5 3 have enacted compulsory licensing
provisions in their patent law. 4 They use compulsory licensing to
provide their citizens greater access to essential pharmaceutical
products.5 Many health and humanitarian organizations assert that
citizens of developing countries lack access to critical life-saving or
life-enhancing prescription drugs because they cannot afford
expensive brand-name pharmaceuticals.56  Governments of
developing countries claim that the pharmaceutical industry exploits
their impoverished citizens, who are dependent on foreign
pharmaceutical companies to provide essential medicines. 7 They
53. See, e.g. Gathii, supra note 18, at 734, 766 (identifying South Africa,
Thailand, and Brazil as three ardent proponents of compulsory licensing of
essential medicines).
54. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa, Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997, sec. 15(c) ("SAMMDRA 15(c)")
(authorizing South African public health officials to issue a compulsory license to
protect public health), available at
http://www.polity.org.za/legislation/1997/act90.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2002);
Thai Patent Act, B.E. 2522 (1992) (containing compulsory licensing provisions);
see also Brazilian Patent Act, Law No. 9279, of May 14, 1996 (establishing that in
cases of emergency or public interest, the Federal Executive Authorities can
officially grant a temporary, non-exclusive compulsory license).
55. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing South Africa's
need for a compulsory licensing law to broaden access to essential drugs that treat
HIV/AIDS patients); see also Park, supra note 51, at 130-31 (describing
Thailand's compulsory licensing provisions, which allow compulsory licenses of
patented products that are unreasonably expensive or cannot sufficiently satisfy
domestic public demand).
56. See, e.g., M~decins Sans Fronti~res, The Campaign, The Basic Pillars
(claiming that "[t]he patenting of medicines confers a market monopoly to
pharmaceutical companies who often charge the same high price world-wide. The
result is that people in the developing world cannot afford the medicines that could
extend, improve, or save their lives"), at http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/campaign/pillars.shtm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); see also World Health
Organization, Expert Committee on Essential Drugs (stating that "[e]ssential drugs
are those drugs that satisfy the health care needs of the majority of the population;
they should therefore be available at all times in adequate amounts and in the
appropriate dosage forms, and at a price that individuals and the community can
afford"), at http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/par/edl/infedlmain.shtml
(last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
57. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 40, at 357 (suggesting that developing
countries prefer weaker patent systems to limit the rights of pharmaceutical
248 [18:237
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contend that the long-term benefits of a strong intellectual property
regime would not alleviate their present public health crises. 8 These
governments recognize the need to invoke national policies that
would alleviate the present human suffering in their countries.5 9
In response to assertions that compulsory licensing impedes future
R&D and investments in pharmaceutical companies, proponents
argue that compulsory licensing laws limit the generic production of
patented drugs to the local domestic market of the country granting
the compulsory license. 60 Therefore, drug companies could recover
their expenses through successful marketing in other countries.6'
Also, the issuance of a compulsory license is contingent on the
existence of certain conditions. 62 Thus, only certain patented
inventions would be subject to compulsory licensing, and the patent
holder would receive reasonable compensation for the license.63
companies that exploit the local populations by charging high prices for essential
products).
58. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to
Address Public Health Crises. A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 72 (2001)
(supporting the notion that the monumental task of addressing and alleviating the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries preempts any long-term intellectual
property concerns).
59. See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 18, at 734 (writing that in 1997, Brazil realized
the enormity of its HIV/AIDS crisis and instituted a policy of free, universal access
to AIDS drugs, which reduced the rate of AIDS-related deaths in Brazil by half
between 1996 and 1999).
60. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
588 (Michael Leaffer ed., 1999) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (providing that a
compulsory licensee predominately supply the domestic market of the host
country).
61. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 161 (arguing that developing countries are a
small source of revenue for the pharmaceutical industry, since they comprise only
about ten percent of international sales).
62. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31 (setting
conditions under which a WTO Member can grant compulsory licenses); see also
Dolmo, supra note 30, at 137, 141 (explaining that South Africa issued
compulsory licenses to abate a public health crisis).
63. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(h). Article
31(h) provides that: "The right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration [for the
2002]
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Developing countries also justify the use of compulsory licenses
as a legitimate means of developing and fostering a local generic
pharmaceutical industry.64 Among the benefits that may arise from a
domestic industry is domestic economic growth, which in turn would
strengthen the global economy. 65 Also, a domestic industry may
provide medications at prices that are compatible with the average
local income.66 Finally, a local generic drug industry would enable a
developing country to retain its intellectual capital (e.g., scientists,
engineers, and pharmacists) by increasing employment opportunities
for professionals in their home country. 67
In general, proponents of compulsory licensing espouse a policy
that public health concerns are paramount to commercial profits, and
should be addressed immediately. 68 Compulsory licensing laws must
provide a delicate balance between maintaining the rights of patent
owners in foreign countries and providing governments with the
necessary equipment to address the health and safety of their citizens
unauthorized use of a patent by the government or by third parties authorized by
the government], taking into account the economic value of the authorization." Id.
64. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 40, at 353-54 (recognizing that the
development of local pharmaceutical industries in developing countries can have
beneficial consequences for the developing world).
65. See id. (associating the development of an enterprising pharmaceutical
industry with national economic growth).
66. See id. (stating that pharmaceutical industries in developing nations can
produce medications at lower costs than pharmaceutical companies in
industrialized countries, due to lower labor costs in developing nations).
67. See id. (implying that a country's ability to retain its professional labor
force heightens its prospects for new technological inventions).
68. See, e.g., Press Release, The Kenya Coalition for Access to Essential
Medicines, Doha Puts Life Before Profit (Sept. 5, 2002) (advocating for
international recognition that public health interests prevail over commercial
profits), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001 -
November/002420.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); see also Press Release, Joint
Statement: Medicines Sans Fronti~res, OXFAM, Third World Network, Consumer
Project on Technology, Consumers International, Health Action International and
The Network, Green Light to Put Public Health First at WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Joint Statement] (interpreting the
Doha Declaration as "a clear political statement that public health concerns must
override commercial interests"), available at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk.whatnew/press/doha2.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
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under exigent circumstances.6 9 This balance of two fundamental
rights is the basic principle of various international treaties on
intellectual property rights.70
3. The TRIPS Compromise
The TRIPS Agreement,7' negotiated at the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, establishes the minimum
international standards of intellectual property protection.72 The
TRIPS Agreement attempts to strike a delicate balance between the
short-term objective of providing access to existing medicines and
the long-term objective of developing new medicines through
incentives for future R&D.73 In the area of patents, Article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement permits WTO Members to grant compulsory
patent licenses under limited circumstances74 and upon satisfying
certain conditions.75 Notably, many analysts argue that the language
69. See Gathii, supra note 18, at 748-50 (exploring the invariable tension
between social and commercial interests within the intellectual property context,
and concluding that the TRIPS Agreement is based on a balance between the two
objectives).
70. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Fact Sheet: TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patents; Philosophy: TRIPS attempts to strike a balance
[hereinafter WTO Fact Sheet] (claiming that the TRIPS Agreement balances long-
term incentives for research and development of new products with short-term
needs for access to existing products), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/factsheet-pharmO le.
htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
71. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60 (establishing an
international legal framework for intellectual property rights).
72. See id. Part II, sec. 5, art. 31 (setting out the framework for national laws on
compulsory licensing).
73. See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 70 (explaining that the underlying goals
of the TRIPS Agreement are equally important).
74. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(b) (limiting the
use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement to circumstances of
national emergency, antitrust violations, and public non-commercial use); see also
Singham, supra note 8, at 401 (arguing that the WTO recognized the dangers of
compulsory licensing and therefore restricted its use by WTO Members for limited
circumstances).
75. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(b) (detailing
the procedural criteria under the TRIPS Agreement for implementing compulsory
licensing laws). Article 31 lists the following pre-conditions to granting a
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement is too ambiguous in its current
form.76 They assert that the WTO should clarify various terms and
provisions therein to prevent developed countries, including the
United States, from using the ambiguity of the TRIPS accord to
thwart the use of compulsory licensing by developing countries.77
B. U.S. POSITION ON COMPULSORY LICENSING
Over the years, U.S. policy on compulsory licensing has been
inconsistent.78 Historically, the United States aggressively opposed
the use of compulsory licensing by foreign countries with respect to
patented pharmaceutical inventions. 79 The United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") has used, or threatened to use, trade
sanctions8 ° against countries that enact laws permitting compulsory
compulsory license: (a) each case must be considered on its merits; (b) the licensee
must first attempt to seek authorization from the patent holder on reasonable
commercial terms and within a reasonable time frame; (c) the scope and duration
of the license must be limited to its authorized purpose; (d) the license cannot be
exclusive; (e) the license cannot be assigned; (f) the licensee must predominately
supply the domestic market of the country granting the license; (g) the license must
terminate once an authoritative body determines that the circumstances giving rise
to the compulsory licensing have ceased to exist and will not reoccur; (h) the
patent holder must be adequately compensated; (i) decisions regarding the issuance
of a license and royalty fees must be subject to judicial review; (j) provisions (b)
and (f) shall not apply in cases arising from anti-competitive practices. See id. art.
3 1 (a)-(k); see also Abbott, supra note 58, at 73-75 (analyzing Article 31 provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement).
76. See Ford, supra note 51, at 960-62 (examining the ambiguity of the
terminology in Article 31).
77. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 80 (alleging that the U.S. government is
exerting economic pressure on developing countries to impede them from enacting
and implementing national laws that would enable them to take advantage of the
flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement).
78. See infra notes 99, 102-108 and accompanying text (analyzing the
progression of U.S. trade policy relating to intellectual property rights).
79. See Ford, supra note 51, at 953-54 (listing various U.S. objections to the
use of compulsory licensing).
80. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107 § 1303 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.
(1988)) (authorizing the USTR to investigate intellectual property right violations
by trading partners and to impose sanctions against countries that do not take
action to strengthen their intellectual property rights regimes).
[18:237
2002] COMPULSORYLICENSING OF MEDICAL INVENTIONS
licensing.8' Many commentators argue that this traditional U.S.
posture of defending patents over public health is incompatible with
the goals of the TRIPS Agreement.12 The U.S. government only
recently adopted a more lenient trade policy towards developing
countries with an HIV/AIDS epidemic. 3 Ironically, the federal
government has frequently exercised its own authority to use or issue
patents without patent holders' permission. 4
The U.S. Patent Act does not contain a general compulsory
licensing section.85 Certain statutory provisions, however, authorize
compulsory licensing for preventing air pollution, 6 public health
purposes,8" government use,8 atomic energy,89 aerospace,90 and
81. See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 18, at 768 (discussing the retaliatory measures
implemented against South Africa by the USTR in response to a South African
compulsory licensing law); see also, e.g., Rafael V. Baca, Compulsory Patent
Licensing in Mexico in the 1990s: The Aftermath of NAFTA and the 1991
Industrial Property Law, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 33, 42 (1995) (writing that in May
1989, the USTR placed Mexico on a "Priority Watch List" pursuant to Special 301
sanctions of the U.S. Trade Act).
82. See Abbott, supra note 58, at 72, 75 (alleging that the United States has
attempted to use the TRIPS Agreement in bad faith to oppose compulsory
licensing laws, even though the TRIPS Agreement expressly authorizes the use of
compulsory licenses to address public health emergencies); see also Letter to
USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (urging the U.S. government to adopt a pro-public
health interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement).
83. See infra notes 102-104, 108 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S.
government's acceptance of compulsory licensing laws enacted in South Africa
and Thailand to address the public health crisis associated with the HIV/AIDS
pandemic).
84. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (highlighting statutory
provisions under which the U.S. government can use compulsory licensing).
85. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting the absence of a general
compulsory licensing provision in the U.S. Patent Act).
86. See Clean Air Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2001) (requiring mandatory
licensing of patents by the government to ensure compliance with the requirements
of the Clean Air Act).
87. See March-in Rights, 35 U.S.C. § 203(1)(b) (2001) (allowing the
government to license patents for inventions funded by the government and
invented by a small business or nonprofit organization in circumstances where the
patent holder could not reasonably satisfy public health or safety needs).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2001) (entitling patent holders the right to sue and
claim compensation for the federal government's unauthorized use of a patent, or
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national security.9 In addition, the U.S. government can issue
compulsory licenses under the antitrust laws to remedy anti-
competitive practices.92 Notwithstanding these provisions that
reserve the right to issue compulsory licenses, the United States
generally promotes strong patent protection rights in the United
States and abroad. 93
The U.S. alliance with the brand-name pharmaceutical industry
generated many political disputes with foreign nations, particularly
developing countries.94 In 1997, the conflicting interests of the
the government's licensing of a patent to third parties acting by or for the
government).
89. See Atomic Energy Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2001) (permitting the
government to use or license a patent in connection with the production of nuclear
materials or atomic energy, if doing so would advance the public interest).
90. See id. § 2457 (2001) (granting patent rights for innovations related to the
national space program to the government rather than the inventor, i.e.,
government employee or contractor).
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2001) (granting government agencies the authority to
withhold patents for inventions that may endanger national security).
92. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (2001)
(describing the procedural requirements for obtaining consent judgments in
antitrust proceedings); see also, e.g., United States v. 3D Systems Corp. & DTM
Corp., No. CIV.l:01CV01237(GK), 2001 WL 964343, at *34 (D.D.C. Aug. 16,
2001) (ordering 3 D Systems Corp. to license 178 of its patents in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, to a third party). The U.S. Department of Justice initiated the
suit against 3D Systems Corp. to prevent a prospective acquisition of DTM Corp.
by 3D Systems Corp., which would give the merged company a monopoly on
rapid prototyping technologies in the U.S. market. See James Love & Michael
Palmedo, Examples of Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in the United
States, ch. 3 (discussing various U.S. antitrust cases in which the courts
implemented compulsory licensing as a remedy to anti-competitive practices), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/us-at.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
93. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 71 (observing that the United States has
pressured developing WTO Members to accelerate their adoption of patent
protection laws for pharmaceuticals); see also Christopher Scott Harrison,
Comment, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S.
Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the North American Free Trade Agreement
and Bill C-91, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 457, 495, 498 (2001) (suggesting
that strong foreign intellectual property regimes allow U.S. pharmaceutical
companies to recover their exorbitant R&D costs and allow the United States to
maintain its competitiveness in the global market).
94. See infra notes 99, 106 and accompanying text (showing that the United
States has taken combative measures against countries that have instituted
compulsory licensing laws, such as South Africa and Brazil).
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United States and the developing world concerning patent rights
attracted international attention when the South African Parliament
passed compulsory licensing legislation9 5 to reduce the cost of
pharmaceuticals.96 The South African government resorted to this
legislation as the only practical means of addressing its growing
HIV/AIDS epidemic.97 By instituting a compulsory licensing law, the
government intended to reduce AIDS-related deaths by broadening
access to affordable generic drugs.98 The United States responded by
threatening the South African government with sanctions and
exerting economic pressure on the country.9 9 It is likely that the U.S.
reaction stemmed partially from a fear that submission to South
Africa's intellectual property policy would set a precedent for other
countries to implement similar policies. 00 The pharmaceutical
95. See SAMMDRA 15(c), supra note 54 (authorizing the South African
Health Minister to issue compulsory licenses for patented pharmaceutical drugs to
protect public health).
96. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 138, 143 (relaying the political ramifications
of and controversy arising from the enactment of SAMMDRA 15(c)).
97. See Ford, supra note 51, at 954 (presenting the public interest motivations
for implementing SAMMDRA 15(c)); see also Dolmo, supra note 30, at 139
(assessing the magnitude of the AIDS-related public health crises in South Africa
and other third-world countries). In 1990, the life span of South Africans was fifty-
nine years; by 2010, it is expected to be less than forty years. See id.
98. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 140 (estimating that .HIV/AIDS drugs cost
$12,000 a year in many African countries); see also Gathii, supra note 18, at 734
(showing that Brazil's compulsory licensing law of 1997 produced five generic
AIDS drugs, causing AIDS-related deaths to drop by about half between 1996 and
1999 and the incidence of HIV infections to drop by sixty to eighty percent).
99. See Consumer Project on Technology, Time-Line of Disputes over
Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Importation in South Africa (showing that the
USTR placed South Africa on its Special 301 Watch List on May 1, 1998), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/sa-timeline.txt (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). On
February 23, 1998, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") had asked the USTR to designate South Africa as a Priority Foreign
country under the Special 301 Review. See id. PhRMA was quoted as saying,
"South Africa has become a 'test case' for those who oppose the U.S.
government's long-standing commitment to improve the terms of protection for all
forms of American intellectual property, including pharmaceutical patents." Id.
100. See Abbott, supra note 58, at 72 (stating that the pharmaceutical industry
advances the slippery-slope argument that the United States' leniency towards
South Africa and Thailand will eventually result in an obligation to permit
compulsory licensing in any country that alleges the necessity for such a law). The
countervailing view is that, first, the devastating nature of the current HIV/AIDS
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industry fueled the U.S. opposition by filing a lawsuit against the
South African government to challenge the law in the South African
courts.'0'
The United States contested South Africa's compulsory licensing
law for two years before capitulating to public and interest group
pressure. 02 By 1999, the U.S. government unexpectedly changed its
combative attitude. 03 The policy shift came as a result of public and
political recognition of the gravity of South Africa's public health
crisis.104 In fact, Vice President Al Gore announced to the U.N.
Security Council in spring 2000 that the United States would pledge
$150 million toward addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South
Africa. 05
epidemic outweighs any long-term patent infringement concerns, and, second,
compulsory licensing for public health emergencies is legal and consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement. See id.
101. See The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa, et. al.
v. President of the Republic of South Africa, No. 4183/98 (Transvaal Provincial
Division) (notice of motion filed on Feb. 18, 1998) (alleging that the South African
government violated the domestic patent law by enacting SAMMDRA 15(c)), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); see
also Dolmo, supra note 30, at 138, 143, 151 (describing the strong opposition to
SAMMDRA 15(c) by the United States and the pharmaceutical industry and
noting that forty major pharmaceutical companies filed suit against South Africa).
102. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 143-44 (maintaining that lobbying efforts by
public health and consumer rights advocates pressured the U.S. administration to
change its position in favor of addressing global public health issues); see also
Gathii, supra note 18, at 768 (determining that world-wide protests motivated
then-Vice President Al Gore, who initially opposed SAMMDRA 15(c), to form a
commission and act as co-chair in negotiating a resolution with South Africa).
103. See Ford, supra note 51, at 955 (reporting that the United States and South
Africa engaged in bilateral negotiations to address South Africa's need for access
to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs). The United States acknowledged the special
nature of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and agreed to stop applying trade pressures on
South Africa, but the United States did not actually acknowledge the legality of
compulsory licensing. Id. at 955-56.
104. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 139-40, 143-44 (attributing the U.S.
government's change in attitude toward SAMMDRA 15(c) to public and interest
group pressures, as well as to the alarming statistics on HIV/AIDS infections and
AIDS-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa).
105. See id. at 152 (showing that the United States is willing to assist in
alleviating a global public health crisis by providing financial assistance and
withdrawing its opposition to South Africa's compulsory licensing law).
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Generally, the current U.S. position on compulsory licensing still
favors the interests of the pharmaceutical industry. 106 As the pivotal
South African situation suggests, 0 7 however, the United States may
withhold trade sanctions against countries implementing compulsory
licensing laws for public health emergencies.10 In light of this recent
shift in U.S. policy and the series of bioterrorism attacks in the
United States since September 11, 2001,109 the United States should
106. See id. at 151-52 (emphasizing the inconsistency in U.S. trade policy
towards other countries that have enacted compulsory licensing laws). For
example, the United States still opposes compulsory licensing laws in Brazil. See
Gathii, supra note 18, at 735-36. In January 2001, the United States requested that
a WTO panel examine Brazil's compulsory licensing law to determine if it
conforms to the TRIPS Agreement. Id.
107. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (showing an evolution of
U.S. policy regarding South Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic and compulsory
licensing measures implemented to alleviate the public health crisis).
108. The Office of the USTR is willing to make concessions to other countries
as well, in the context of the AIDS crisis. In a letter to Thailand, the USTR Office
wrote:
We recognize and support the Government of Thailand's goal of extending
effective health care to all its citizens - including people living with AIDS.
This is a goal we fully endorse and believe can be achieved while providing
appropriate protections for intellectual property .... We encourage Thai
officials to explore all options for extending access to effective treatments,
including ongoing direct dialogue with pharmaceutical manufacturers. But the
final choice is one for Thailand to make. If the Thai government determines
that issuing a compulsory license is required to address its health care crisis,
the United States will raise no objection, provided the compulsory license is
issued in a manner fully consistent with the WTO Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Letter from Joseph S. Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Services,
Investment and Intellectual Property, to Mr. Paisan Tan-Ud, Chairman of PHA
Network of Thailand (Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/ustrletterjan27.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2002); see also Exec. Order No. 13,155, Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 10, 2000) (exempting sub-
Saharan African countries from trade sanctions if any such country promulgates a
law that broadens access to HIV/AIDS drugs or medical devices and is consistent
with the TRIPS Agreement).
109. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (providing an account of
recent bioterrorist activities in the Unites States and the lethal consequences of
bioterrorism).
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implement its own compulsory licensing laws as a means of
facilitating global preparation for super-terrorist activities. 10
C. THE CURRENT U.S. DILEMMA ON COMPULSORY LICENSING
ARISING FROM THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM
At the outbreak of the anthrax attacks in 2001, the Bush
Administration faced the dilemma of whether to issue a compulsory
license of the antibiotic ciprofloxacin ("Cipro"), 11 a standard
treatment for individuals exposed to anthrax." 2 Naturally, public
health officials wanted to insure the protection of the American
public by stockpiling an adequate supply of Cipro in the event of
additional bioterrorist attacks." 3 The U.S. government could have
achieved this goal by exercising its eminent domain authority under
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to issue a compulsory license." 4 Issuing such a
110. See discussion infra Part III.D (advocating the enactment of the
compulsory licensing bills currently pending in Congress to alleviate health needs
that may not be met by patent holders).
11. See Letter from Consumer Project on Technology to Tommy G. Thompson,
Secretary of Health and Human Services [hereinafter CPT's Letter to Secretary
Thompson] (noting that only one pharmaceutical firm, Bayer, markets
ciprofloxacin in the United States), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/nadethom 10182001 .html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2002); see also Consumer Project on Technology, Talking Points on Cipro
Patent Dispute [hereinafter CPT's Talking Points on Cipro] (highlighting that at
least five generic companies, which have received FDA approval for the quality of
their ciprofloxacin, could manufacture the drug), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/talkingpoints.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2002).
112. See Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, The Cipro Rip-Offand the
Public Health, ZNet Daily Commentaries (discussing the government's conflict of
interest between protecting the public health and promoting corporate
profiteering), at http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2001-12/02mokhiber-
weissman.cfm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
113. See CPT's Talking Points on Cipro, supra note III (reporting that
Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson sought an emergency
reserve of 1.2 billion pills to adequately treat ten million American citizens, but
that Bayer could only produce two million pills per day).
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (allowing the federal government to invoke its
eminent domain power to use or license a patent without the authorization of the
patent owner).
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license for Cipro, however, would have undermined the U.S. position
at the WTO conference" 5 in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. "6
The Doha agenda included central issues concerning the
compulsory licensing of drugs, and the importation of drugs under a
compulsory license when countries have insufficient domestic
manufacturing capabilities." 7 Public health officials feared that if
they granted a compulsory license for Cipro, the United States could
not legitimately oppose the compulsory licensing laws of other
countries at the WTO conference, as it had done in the past." 8
Therefore, rather than compromise the U.S. position during the Doha
conference, officials chose to negotiate an agreement with Bayer
Corporation, the manufacturer of Cipro, for the bulk purchase of
Cipro at a discounted rate."I9
The Cipro situation illustrates how the United States may find
itself in a precarious political position in the wake of other potential
115. See World Trade Organization, The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
(noting that the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference took place from November 9-
14, 2001 in Doha, Qatar), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0le/minOl-e.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2002).
116. See Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 112 (proposing that the U.S.
administration's reluctance to authorize the generic production of Cipro stemmed
from the recognition that it would jeopardize its negotiating position in the
impending Doha WTO meeting); see also CPT's Talking Points on Cipro, supra
note 111 (suggesting that the Bush Administration was "cutting comers on public
health" to protect its position against compulsory licensing of drugs during the
Doha WTO conference).
117. See World Trade Organization, supra note 115 (discussing the agenda of
the Doha Ministerial Conference).
118. See CPT's Talking Points on Cipro, supra note 111 (anticipating that the
United States, Canada, and the European Community would oppose the African
countries at the Doha WTO conference on the central issues of compulsory
licensing of drugs and the importation of drugs under a compulsory license by
countries that do not have an adequate capacity for the domestic production of the
drugs).
119. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS,
Bayer Agree to Cipro Purchase (Oct. 24, 2001) (reporting that under the terms of
the HHS-Bayer agreement, the federal government will purchase the first order of
100 million pills at 95 cents per tablet, rather than the previous charge of $1.77 per
tablet), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011024.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
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bioterrorist attacks. 2 ' The outcome of the Cipro patent dispute
suggests that the Bush Administration is reluctant to change its anti-
compulsory licensing policy, even when such a policy threatens to
jeopardize American lives. 2' The daunting prospect of high
casualties, however, would likely compel the government to use
compulsory licensing in the event of a large-scale biological or
chemical attack in the United States, or in a foreign country that
could not afford life-saving antibiotics.'22 For instance, in 1999, the
U.S. government succumbed to public and political pressure and
reversed its policy against the compulsory licensing law
implemented by the South African government in order to combat its
HIV/AIDS epidemic.'23 Similarly, the U.S. government will be
subject to high public criticism and political pressure if it does not re-
evaluate its position so as to utilize compulsory licensing in the wake
of a public health emergency caused by super-terrorism.12 4
120. See Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 112 (asserting that the U.S.
government is acting hypocritically by contemplating the use of compulsory
licensing to stockpile supplies of Cipro while simultaneously trying to limit the
ability of poor countries to use compulsory licensing to address their public health
crises).
121. See id. (accusing the Bush Administration of colluding with the
pharmaceutical industry to protect patent monopolies instead of protecting public
health); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, The Nation,- Public Health or Public
Relations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, sec. 4, at 4 (questioning the Bush
Administration's decision to prioritize Bayer's patent right on Cipro over
consumer concerns of inadequate access to Cipro).
122. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 143-44 (describing the United States'
attitudinal change towards South Africa's compulsory licensing law once U.S.
officials became aware of the alarming fatality statistics in South Africa associated
with HIV/AIDS infections).
123. See id. (stating that public health and consumer rights advocates alerted
U.S. officials about the dire nature of the public health crisis in South Africa and
lobbied successfully to initiate a U.S. policy shift).
124. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Charles Schumer, Schumer: New
Cipro Source Could Dramatically Increase Supply (Oct. 16, 2001) (reporting that
Senator Schumer sent a letter to Secretary Thompson of the Department of Health
and Human Services, writing that, "[B]ayer can only produce so much Cipro, and
we should not put our best response to anthrax in the hands of just one
manufacturer ... If we make arrangements to purchase it from multiple generic
drug manufacturers, we'll have it if we need it"), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/pressreleases/PROO
728.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); see also Mark Weisbrot, Protecting
Pharmaceutical Companies from the Threat of Bio-Terrorism, ZNet (observing
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D. PROPOSED U.S. COMPULSORY LICENSING LEGISLATION
On May 3, 2001, Representative Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio)
introduced a bill entitled the Affordable Prescription Drugs and
Medical Inventions Act ("House Bill 1708").25 If enacted, House
Bill 1708 would confer to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") the
authority to grant compulsory licenses of patented prescription drugs
and health care devices under certain circumstances,1 26 without the
authorization of the patent holders. 2 7 The bill requires that generic
companies pay reasonable royalties to a patent holder in exchange
for a license.' 28
Following the acts of terrorism against the United States on
September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks,
Representative Brown also sponsored the Public Health Emergency
Medicines Act ("House Bill 3235") on November 6, 2001.129 House
that pressure from Senator Charles Schumer and consumer advocate groups caused
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to threaten to purchase generic drugs
if Bayer did not cut its price for Cipro), at http://www.zmag.org/weispharm.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
125. H.R. 1708, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR01708:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
House Bill 1708 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and to the
Committee on Energy and Commerce. See id. Each committee then referred the
bill to subcommittees-Subcommittee on Courts, the Intemet, and Intellectual
Property and Subcommittee on Health-neither of which has taken any further
action as of the date of this Comment. Id.
126. See H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b) (listing five conditions under which compulsory
licensing is permissible).
127. See id. (granting the discretion to issue compulsory licenses to HHS and the
FTC); see also Allan Z. Litovsky, The Law of Unintended Consequences: How
Will The Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act Affect
American Health Care?, 13 No. 5 HEALTH LAW. 20, 21-22 (2001) (emphasizing
the significance of amending U.S. patent law to allow compulsory licensing).
128. See H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(d) (listing a number of factors for the Secretary of
HHS and the FTC to consider in determining a reasonable compensation for the
patent holder for use of the patent).
129. H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03235:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
House Bill 3235 was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, which referred
the bill to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. Id.
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Bill 3235 authorizes the Secretary of HHS to grant compulsory
licenses of patented health care products'30 in the event of a public
health emergency.' 3' The premise of these two compulsory licensing
bills is that introducing more generic competition in the
pharmaceutical market would reduce the cost of prescription drugs in
the United States and ease monopolistic control of the
pharmaceutical industry. 3 2 Supporters of the bills believe that even
the mere threat of compulsory licensing would likely encourage
pharmaceutical companies to provide affordable drugs to U.S.
citizens."'3
II. ANALYSIS
A. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING FRAMEWORK OF
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
The TRIPS Agreement allows for compulsory licensing under
Article 31, but limits its use for antitrust violations, governmental
use, and extremely urgent circumstances, including national
emergencies.' Article 31, entitled "Other Use Without
The subcommittee has not taken any further action as of the date of this Comment.
See id.
130. See H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(e) (defining "health care product" as any drug or
device, any biological product, or any technology or process as applied to health or
health care).
13 1. See id. (limiting the export of health care products in emergency situations
to those countries that provide an adequate system of protection for patent owners'
rights).
132. See The Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, Statement of Congressman
Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member, Commerce Health and Environmental
Subcommittee [hereinafter Statement of Congressman Brown] (explaining the
importance of implementing market forces to induce pharmaceutical companies to
reduce prescription drug costs), at http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/afpda.htm
(last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
133. See id. (suggesting that drug companies would voluntarily lower their
prices in order to avoid compulsory licensing under the proposed bills).
134. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(b) (carving out
exceptions to the general requirement that the licensee attempt to obtain a
voluntary license from the patent holder on reasonable terms and conditions before
applying for a compulsory license); see also id. Part I, art. 8, para. 2 (providing
exceptions to patent enforcement to prevent the abuse of patent rights and
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Authorization of the Right Holder,"' 35 does not expressly refer to the
term compulsory licensing. 3 6  Rather, the permissibility of
compulsory licensing is implied when Article 31 is read in
conjunction with Article 2(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and Article
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention of 1967.37 Article 2(1) of the TRIPS
Agreement states that WTO Members must comply with specific
articles of the Paris Convention, including Article 5 .38 Article
5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention expressly permits the use of
compulsory licensing by governmental authorities in order to prevent
patent abuses by patent holders. 3 9 Therefore, Article 31 of the
unreasonable trade restraints); see also id. Part II, sec. 8, art. 40, paras. 1-2
(allowing WTO Members to enact legislation that controls the licensing of patents
to prevent anti-competitive practices by patent holders and licensees).
135. See id., Part II, sec. 5, art. 31. Article 31 reads: "Where the law of a
Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties
authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected . . . ." Id.
(emphasis added); see also id., art. 31, n. 7 (defining the term "other use" in Article
31 as "use other than that allowed under Article 30"); World Trade Organization,
Fact Sheet.- TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents; Obligations and exceptions
(explaining that "other use" includes compulsory licensing and use by
governments for their own purposes), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips..e/factsheetpharm02_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2002); Abbott, supra note 42, at 15 n.34 (noting that footnote 7 to Article
31 indicates that Members may not invoke both Articles 30 and 31 in connection
with the same practice).
136. See Ford, supra note 51, at 958 (noting that the phrase compulsory
licensing does not appear in the text of the TRIPS Agreement).
137. See id. (determining that the language of Article 31 implies compulsory
licensing); see also Abbott, supra note 58, at 73-74 (concluding that Article 31 of
the TRIPS Agreement expressly allows compulsory licensing, since Article 2 of
the TRIPS accord states that the Paris Convention of 1967 applies to Parts I, 1II,
and IV of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17 (Michael Leaffer ed., 1999) [hereinafter Paris
Convention] (establishing a multilateral agreement for intellectual property rights
and obligations).
138. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part 1, art. 2, paras. 1-2 (emphasizing
that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement do not discredit the existing
obligations under other international treaties, particularly the Paris Convention).
This article of the TRIPS Agreement also mandates compliance with Articles 1-12
and 19 of the Paris Convention. Id.
139. See Paris Convention, supra note 137, at 24 (stating in Article 5, sec. A(2)
that "[e]ach country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures
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TRIPS Agreement is a key provision for many WTO Members that
need expeditious access to affordable prescription drugs. 4 '
1. Legal Obstacle to Compulsory Licensing Created by Article 31()9
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth conditions under
which WTO Members may grant compulsory licenses.' 41 Article
31 (f) of the Agreement is one of the most controversial provisions of
the treaty. 42 Subparagraph (f) provides that a compulsory license
"[s]hall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market of the Member authorizing such use."' 143 Subparagraph (k)
provides that "[m]embers are not obliged to apply the conditions set
forth in [subparagraph (f)] where such use is permitted to remedy a
practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be
anti-competitive."'' 44 The express text of the provision limits a
government's use of compulsory licensing to predominantly supply
its domestic market, except when necessary to remedy anti-
competitive practices. 141
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might
result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for
example, failure to work"); see also Julian-Arnold, supra note 32, at 352
(analyzing compulsory licensing provisions under the Paris Convention).
140. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 3 1(b) (allowing
other uses of patents without authorization of the right holder, which may be
interpreted as allowing compulsory licensing). But see Ford, supra note 51, at 963-
67 (discussing the ambiguity of the language in Article 31 and the potential for
disparate interpretation of the ambiguous terms).
141. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (listing pre-conditions to granting
a compulsory license); see also Abbott, supra note 58, at 73-75 (analyzing Article
31 provisions of the TRIPS Agreement).
142. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (indicating that public health
coalitions argue for a liberal interpretation of subparagraph (f), while the United
States and the European Community support a more restrictive view).
143. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(0.
144. ld. art. 31 (k).
145. See Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns Into Patent
Legislation in Developing Countries, SOUTH CENTRE PUBLICATIONS, ch. X, sec. 2
(2000) (concluding that a compulsory licensee can export a licensed product when
the export is not the primary transaction of the licensee with regard to the product,
or when the patent holder is engaging in monopolistic practices), at
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/publichealth/publichealth-
12.htm#P1449_146569 (last visited Sept.'5, 2002); see also Consumer Project on
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From the perspective of WTO Members from developing
countries, the restriction under Article 3 1(f) on compulsory licensing
for exports presents a barrier to essential medicines.'46 The provision
stipulates that a compulsory license must be used "predominantly"
(i.e., more than half) for the supply of the domestic market of the
government issuing the license.'47 On its express terms, subparagraph
(f) does not prohibit a WTO Member from authorizing a compulsory
license to import medicines, but it places a significant constraint on
the exporters. 48 By requiring foreign compulsory licensees to supply
a predominant part of their production to their domestic market,
subparagraph (f) limits the licensee's ability to export medicines to a
country with public health needs. 49 This limitation creates a problem
Technology, Comments Presented at the WHO/WTO Joint Secretariat Workshop
on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs (delivered in Hosbjor,
Norway on Apr. 11, 2001) [hereinafter CPT's Comments Presented at the
WHO/WTO Joint Secretariat Workshop] (commenting that the United States
extensively uses the Article 3 1(k) exception of the TRIPS Agreement by granting
compulsory licenses to remedy anti-competitive conduct, irrespective of the market
restrictions imposed by Article 31 (f)), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/econ/jamie-hosbjor.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2002).
146. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (analyzing the harmful
consequences of restricting compulsory licensing to domestic manufacturers, and
arguing that the American and European public do not support their government's
trade policies, which limit access to affordable medicines for developing
countries).
147. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31(f). The
relevant text reads: "Any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply
of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use." Id. (emphasis
added). However, this limitation may not apply in cases where a government
grants a compulsory license to remedy anti-competitive practices. See id. art. 31(k)
(granting discretion to member nations as to the application of the export limitation
under Section (f)); see also Correa, supra note 145, at sec. 2 (interpreting Article
31(f) to mean that exports "should probably not constitute the main activity of the
licensee with regard to the licensed product").
148. See Consumer Project on Technology, Exports of Medicines under TRIPS
[hereinafter Exports of Medicines under TRIPS] (recognizing that although imports
of medicines under a compulsory license are permitted under the TRIPS
framework, importers will have difficulty finding an export source based on the
express language of Article 31(f)), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-
health/2001-November/002425.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
149. See Frederick M. Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs:
The TRIPS Agenda at the WTO after the Doha Declaration on Public Health 26
(Feb. 2002) (unpublished paper, on file with Quaker United Nations Office -
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for developing countries that either completely lack or have an
insufficient capacity for manufacturing pharmaceuticals. 50 Under the
existing TRIPS Agreement rules, poor countries can procure
medicines from other developing or least developed countries that do
not currently have patent protection for pharmaceutical products.''
However, this option will be unavailable once the suppliers become
Geneva) (stating that "Article 3 1(f) creates difficulties on the supply and demand
side of the generic drug pipeline" because generic suppliers are precluded from
exporting under a compulsory license, while importers are unable to satisfy the
public demand for pharmaceuticals due to industrial constraints and the export
limitation of Article 3 1(f)).
150. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, para. 6 (adopted
Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] (acknowledging that developing
countries with inadequate manufacturing capacities may have problems in
implementing compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/minO I _e/mindecltrips-e.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002). However, instead of addressing the serious problem that
Article 31(f) poses, the WTO referred the issue to the TRIPS Council to find a
solution and report back before the end of 2002. See id. Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration reads:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem
and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.
Id.; see also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, Fourth Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar, paras. 38-41 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001) (recognizing the
need to provide funding to developing countries to improve their technological
capacity), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 Ie/mindecle.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
151. See Exports of Medicines under TRIPS, supra note 148 (appreciating the
present availability of medicines that are not under patent ("off-patent medicines"),
but warning that developing countries will have difficulty in finding exporters in
the future once the TRIPS Agreement becomes effective for all WTO developing
Members); see also Abbott, supra note 42, at 3 (acknowledging the permissibility
of importing off-patent medicines from Brazil, China, and India, since the existing
TRIPS Agreement does not mandate an export or import restriction). Brazil
amended its patent law in 1996 to authorize patent protection for pharmaceuticals
as of the effective date of the amendments, but did not authorize retroactive
protection for non-patented products already on the market. Id. at 3 n.2. Also,
although India does not currently provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals,
the Parliament is debating an amendment to the patent law that would mandate
protection. Id. at 3 n.3.
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TRIPS-compliant in 2005 or 2006, requiring them to protect the
legitimate rights of patent holders. 52
A restrictive interpretation of Article 31(f) creates a paradox. 153
The poor nations that are most in need of medicines are prevented
from using compulsory licensing, while rich nations with developed
industrial and technological capacities benefit from the compulsory
licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 54 These unintended
consequences suggest that Article 31(f) should be construed more
liberally so as to allow WTO Members to grant compulsory licenses
to foreign generic manufacturers, who can produce and export health
products back to the country that issued the license. 155
2. The Article 30 Approach to Authorizing Exports of Medicines
Under a Compulsory License
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, a patent exception clause,
could also be interpreted broadly so as to circumvent the export
problems that arise under Article 31(f). 156 Article 30 expressly
provides exceptions to exclusive patent rights with three conditions:
(1) the exception must be limited; (2) it must not unreasonably
152. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 3 (noting that in recognition of the social and
economic adjustments that countries must undergo to comply with the TRIPS
Agreement, the WTO granted a transition period for some member countries to
become TRIPS compliant, that is. developing Members have until January 1, 2005,
and least developed Members have until January 1, 2006, to comply).
153. See id. at 15 (discussing the implementation problems that result from a
constrictive reading of Article 31 (f)).
154. See id. (reasoning that Article 31(f) impedes developing countries from
implementing compulsory licensing because they lack the capacities and the
domestic markets for local manufacturing); see also Letter to USTR Zoellick,
supra note 52 (noting that a country's level of technological advancement affects
its ability to use compulsory licensing under the provisions of Section 3 1(f)).
155. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 150, at paras. 17-19 (reaffirming the
need for a flexible interpretation of TRIPS to allow governments to protect public
health over patent rights); see also Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52
(recommending that the United States support an expansive reading of Article
31(f) so that developing countries can overcome a serious impediment to
compulsory licensing caused by underdeveloped industrial capacities).
156. See Exports of Medicines under TRIPS, supra note 148 (recommending
that developing countries adopt the Article 30 approach and "take their chances on
a WTO dispute panel").
267
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
conflict with the normal use of the patent; and (3) the legitimate
interests of the patent holder must be protected, while also taking
into account the legitimate interests of third parties. 5 7 The language
of Article 30 implies that a WTO Member may export patented
pharmaceuticals to a foreign market in cases where the importing
country does not provide patent protection,'58 or where the importing
country grants a compulsory license. 5 9 Applying the "limited
exception" in Article 30 to the export of medicines would be most
consistent with the WTO Ministerial declaration ("Doha
Declaration") drafted at the recent Doha conference. 60 The Doha
Declaration states that WTO Members should implement the TRIPS
Agreement in a manner supporting public health and promoting
access to medicines for all.' 6' Thus, a liberal interpretation of Article
157. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 30. Article 30
reads:
[WTO] Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.
See also Abbott, supra note 149, at 35-36 (interpreting the express terminology of
Article 30). "Limited exceptions" means that the WTO may interpret Article 30 in
a manner allowing deviations from the exclusive patent rights conferred by Article
28 of the TRIPS Agreement, but such deviations must be within certain
boundaries. See id. at 35. "Provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent" means that deviations from the
enforcement of patent rights should not operate inequitably in the ordinary use of
patents. See id. "[A]nd do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties" means that
deviations should not inequitably affect the patent holder's expected rights, while
also taking into consideration the effect on third parties. See id. at 36.
158. See Exports of Medicines under TRIPS, supra note 148 (identifying India
as an export source that does not currently provide patent protection for
pharmaceutical products, but will be obligated to comply with TRIPS in 2006).
159. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 14-15 (reasoning that as long as the three
criteria of Article 30 are satisfied, the clause allows an exception for the issuance
of a compulsory license to export products, an action that Article 31(f) fails to
expressly permit).
160. See id. at 15 (suggesting that unmet public health and nutrition needs can
satisfy the "limited" nature of the Article 30 exception to patent rights).
161. See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 150 (recognizing the need to
render an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that promotes public health).
Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration reads: "[W]e affirm that the [TRIPS]
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30 would permit a country to use compulsory licensing for exporting
medicines for public health purposes, where the legitimate interests
of the patent owner are protected in the export market.'62 This is the
approach that U.S. House Representatives invoked in House Bill
3235, the compulsory licensing bill discussed supra that is currently
pending in Congress. 163
B. ANALYSIS OF PENDING U.S. COMPULSORY LICENSING BILLS
The compulsory licensing bills that are presently in congressional
committees are consistent with the compulsory licensing provisions
of the TRIPS Agreement. 64 House Bills 1708 and 3235 satisfy the
conditions for compulsory licensing set forth in Article 31 of the
TRIPS accord. 6 5 Also, House Bill 3235 adopts a liberal construction
of Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement, which allows the U.S.
government to issue compulsory licenses with more expansive
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive
of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all." Id.
162. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (urging the U.S. government to
support an interpretation of Article 30 that would complement the approach taken
in House Bill 3235, which proposes to permit exports of medicines for public
health emergencies); see also Abbott, supra note 149, at 55 (analyzing the
significance of the Doha Declaration with regards to eliminating legal barriers to
compulsory licensing). Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration indicates that when a
WTO Member cannot address its public health needs by issuing a compulsory
license due to an insufficient manufacturing capacity, that insufficiency can serve
as a basis for authorizing another WTO Member to export the necessary drugs to
its co-Member by invoking an Article 30 limited exception to exclusive patent
rights. See id.; see also Doha Declaration, supra note 150, para. 6.
163. See H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(c) (authorizing the Secretary of HHS to grant
compulsory licenses for export of patented health care products in the event of
public health emergencies).
164. See infra notes 165-166 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
proposed U.S. compulsory licensing bills comply with international law).
165. See generally H.R. 1708; H.R. 3235 (noting that House Bills 1708 and
3235 do not contain any provisions that would violate any of the conditions for
compulsory licensing in Article 31 or any other TRIPS provisions). See also H.R.
1708 sec. 2(a)(e); H.R. 3235 sec. 2 (a)(d) (requiring that any regulations adopted
implement the purposes of the legislation in compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement).
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authority than the existing patent regime offers.'66 The incorporation
of these bills into U.S. patent law would signify U.S. support for a
WTO interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that protects public
health and promotes access to medicines for all nations. 6 7
1. Compulsory Licensing Framework of House Bill 1708
House Bill 1708 establishes guidelines under which the Secretary
of HHS and the FTC could grant a compulsory license for health-
related products.'68 The language of House Bill 1708 gives the
Secretary and the FTC broad discretion in evaluating the criteria for
the issuance of unauthorized patent licenses. 6 9 First, it requires a
determination that the patent holder (or its contractor, licensee, or
assignee) has neither taken, nor is expected to take "effective steps"
within a "reasonable time" to apply the patented invention in a "field
of use.' 170 However, the bill does not define what constitutes
"reasonable time," "effective steps," and "field of use," deferring to
the Secretary and the FTC to define the terms. 7's The second
condition requires a determination that the patent holder (or any of
its contractors, licensees, or assignees) is unable to provide
medicines or other health care products "adequately" to alleviate
public health or safety emergencies. 72 The bill, however, does not
specify what constitutes adequacy for satisfying health and safety
166. See infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text (developing the argument
that although Article 30 has not yet been implemented by WTO Members to allow
an export exception for compulsory licensing-which is expressly authorized in
House Bill 3235-it may be so interpreted).
167. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (indicating that if the United
States adopts a policy approach similar to the export exception invoked in House
Bill 3235, it would allow developing countries to take advantage of the flexibility
of the TRIPS Agreement).
168. See H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b) (enumerating five conditions under which
government officials may issue compulsory licenses).
169. See Litovsky, supra note 127, at 20 (emphasizing that the bill would grant
unprecedented powers to the Secretary of HHS and the FTC to grant compulsory
licenses for health care products).
170. H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b)(l).
171. See Litovsky, supra note 127, at 20 (arguing that the language in the bill is
too ambiguous, thereby giving too much discretion to public health authorities).
172. H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b)(2).
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needs. 173 The Secretary and the FTC have discretion in determining
this adequacy requirement.17 4
The third condition for compulsory licensing under House Bill
1708 is a determination that the patent holder employs anti-
competitive practices. 175 Although the bill contains examples of
monopolistic practices-e.g., excessive pricing and unreasonable
licensing terms for a patented invention relating to health care-it
does not provide clear criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of
the patent holder's practices to determine the presence of anti-
competitive behavior. 76 Under the fourth condition, the Secretary of
HHS or the FTC must determine that the patent obstructs future
innovations that involve an "important technical advance.' 77 Once
again, the Secretary and the FTC have considerable latitude in
determining what constitutes an "important technical advance" and
deciding whether such technological progress warrants the limitation
of patent rights.'78 Finally, the Secretary or the FTC can issue a
compulsory license if they determine that the patent is both necessary
for continuing research that promotes public health and is licensed on
unreasonable terms and conditions."7 9 The bill gives the authorities
discretion to evaluate the reasonableness of patent license terms and
conditions. 80
The broad language of House Bill 1708 allows a flexible
interpretation of the conditions for compulsory licensing for health-
173. See Litovsky, supra note 127, at 20 (contemplating whether the cost of a
pharmaceutical product would factor into the adequacy analysis).
174. See id. (criticizing the broad authority the bill grants to the Secretary of
HHS and the FTC in determining whether to issue compulsory licenses).
175. H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b)(3).
176. See id. (providing two examples of anti-competitive practices that would
justify compulsory licensing).
177. H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b)(4).
178. See Litovsky, supra note 127, at 20 (highlighting that the bill fails to
specify the criteria for determining what constitutes an "important technological
advance," and falls short of stating who would make the determination).
179. H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(b)(5).
180. See Litovsky, supra note 127, at 20-21 (criticizing the lack of substantive
guidelines for evaluating the public health interest and the "reasonableness" of the
license terms and conditions).
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related products in the United States.' 8' If Congress enacts House
Bill 1708, compulsory licensing may become a useful administrative
tool for deterring pharmaceutical companies from inflating drug
prices. 8 2 Controlling the prices of pharmaceutical products is more
important than ever in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, given
the increase in demand for the production and worldwide availability
of counterterrorism health products.'83
2. Compulsory Licensing Framework of House Bill 3235
House Bill 3235 provides a narrower scope for the use of
compulsory licensing than House Bill 1708, but may have far greater
global consequences.' 84 House Bill 1708 grants officials the authority
to issue compulsory licenses when a patent holder satisfies one of
five conditions.'85 By contrast, section 2(a)(a) of House Bill 3235
limits the use of compulsory licensing by the government to national
public health emergencies. 8 6 The Secretary of HHS, the sole
decision-making authority, still has flexibility in determining what
circumstances constitute a public health emergency.'87 In addition,
181. See id. at 20 (commenting that the broad language of the bill grants a high
degree of discretion to the Secretary of HHS and the FTC).
182. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (promoting the bill
as the best weapon against the brand-name pharmaceutical industry's exploitation
of patented drugs).
183. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 124 (calling on HHS to purchase
cheaper versions of Cipro in bulk quantities rather than Bayer's more expensive
version in order to calm the public and meet its needs).
184. See Consumer Project on Technology, CPTech Comments on H.R. 3235 the
"Public Health Emergency Medicines Act" [hereinafter CPT's Comments on H.R.
3235] (discussing the importance of a provision that would allow exports of
medicines in foreign public health emergency situations arising from biological or
chemical terrorism), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/200 I-
November/002358.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
185. See supra notes 168-180 (discussing the five circumstances in which
compulsory licensing may be granted under House Bill 1708)
186. H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(a).
187. See id. (lacking a definition for "public health emergency"); see also Joint
Statement, supra note 68 (noting that although Article 31(b) of the TRIPS
Agreement authorizes the use of compulsory licensing by WTO Members to
address an emergency situation, it fails to define what constitutes an emergency
situation, thereby allowing the individual countries to make the determination).
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section 2(a)(c) of House Bill 3235 gives the Secretary the authority
to permit the use of compulsory licenses for exporting medicines to a
country experiencing a public health emergency. 88 In conformity
with Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, the provision only allows
exports from countries that protect the legitimate interests of the
patent owner. 8 9
Nonetheless, House Bill 3235 may actually provide more
expansive authority than the TRIPS Agreement for allowing the
government to authorize the non-voluntary use of a patent for a
foreign market. 90 The current TRIPS framework does not explicitly
authorize the export of medicines that are manufactured pursuant to a
compulsory license.' 9' However, as discussed earlier, a liberal
interpretation of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, which allows
limited exceptions to patent rights enforcement, could permit exports
of medicines if the export market protects the legitimate interests of
the patent holder. 92 This is the approach proposed in House Bill
3235.193 Thus, the bill expressly allows the U.S. government to use
compulsory licensing to export drugs to foreign countries under
requisite circumstances, while the permissibility of such an act is still
ambiguous under the TRIPS Agreement. 9 The approach taken by
188. H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(c).
189. See H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(c)-(a)(d) (expressing conformity with the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement).
190. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (indicating that Article 30
could authorize exports of medicines, like House Bill 3235, but developing
countries have not utilized it as of yet due to opposition from the United States and
the European Union).
191. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, arts. 30-31 (lacking an
express provision that permits exports of medicines).
192. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 15-16 (concluding that an Article 30 "limited
exception" may apply to compulsory licensing for exports).
193. See H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(c) (permitting the export of health care products in
public health emergencies, pursuant to the unauthorized use of a patent, where the
legitimate interests of the patent owner are protected in the export market); see
also Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (advocating the approach taken by the
bill in authorizing the use of compulsory licensing for the export of medicines).
194. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (comparing House Bill 3235 to
the TRIPS Agreement and submitting that the language of TRIPS Article 30 could
and should be construed to conform to the export provision of the U.S. bill).
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House Bill 3235 could save thousands of lives in the event of a large-
scale international incident of biological or chemical terrorism.'95
C. IMPLICATIONS OF A U.S. COMPULSORY LICENSING LAW ON
GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS
House Bills 1708 and 3235 primarily address the high cost of
prescription drugs in the United States. 96 However, if Congress
enacts the bills into law, compulsory licensing arrangements for
prescription drugs in the United States would also increase global
access to therapeutic drugs to treat victims of biological or chemical
terrorism. 197
1. Impact on Worldwide Availability of Pharmaceutical Products to
Combat Super-Terrorism
House Bills 1708 and 3235 would facilitate access to counter-
terrorism drugs for foreign nations that are victimized by biological
or chemical warfare in two ways.98 First, House Bill 3235 would
allow compulsory licensees to export therapeutic drugs immediately
to foreign countries following a biological or chemical attack.'99
195. See id. (suggesting that House Bill 3235 could be used to rush life-saving
medicines to countries with inadequate access to health related products in case of
an act of biological terrorism in that country).
196. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (attributing the
inflation in employee health plan premiums and the curtailment of Medicare
coverage to an excessive increase in prescription drug costs in the United States
since 1993). Brown also notes that the primary incentive for introducing
compulsory licensing bills in Congress is to reduce the cost of prescription
medications for U.S. citizens. Id.
197. See CPT's Letter to Secretary Thompson, supra note 11l (urging the Bush
Administration to provide a legal framework for acquiring critical medicines
immediately).
198. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (determining that
House Bill 3235 would facilitate the use of compulsory licensing by addressing
two controversial issues-the amount of remuneration due to a patent holder and
the ability to export products pursuant to a compulsory license).
199. See infra notes 204-25 and accompanying text (discussing the global
benefits of allowing one country to use compulsory licensing to export health
related products to another country).
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Second, both House Bills 3235 and 1708 provide a compensation
framework that would expedite the compulsory licensing process.
200
The export provision of House Bill 3235 is necessary to facilitate
foreign access to therapeutic drugs that pharmaceutical companies
patent in the United States.20 Most developing countries do not have
the factories to produce vaccines or antibiotics that would alleviate
the suffering and reduce the casualties from biological or chemical
warfare.20 2 Following the bioterrorism attacks in the United States in
October 2001, many governments focused on methods of improving
the response to such future events in their own countries. 23 However,
in terms of preparation for responding to super-terrorism, the United
States is in the best position to provide public health disaster relief in
case of an international incident.20 4 Without House Bill 3235, it is
unclear how much time would pass before the U.S. government
would render aid to a foreign country facing a public health crisis
from super-terrorism. For example, it took years of pressure by
200. See discussion infra Part I1.C.2 (showing the need for legislation that would
address the concerns of U.S. officials regarding the compensation process for
compulsory licensing under the current law).
201. See Joint Letter from Consumer Project on Technology, Essential Action,
Medicines Sans Frontibres, Oxfam International, Health GAP Coalition, and the
Third World Network to the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Council
[hereinafter Joint Letter to the TRIPS Council] (arguing that exports of patented
medicines are essential for protecting public health and promoting universal access
to medicines), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/art30exports.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
202. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (noting that local
manufacturers in most developing countries do not have the factories or
technological capacity to produce pharmaceutical products).
203. See Pan American Health Organization ("PAHO"), Conclusions of the
Advisory Meeting on Bioterrorism (reporting that the bioterrorism incidents in the
United States precipitated a PAHO conference to discuss preparation for
responding to bioterrorism), at
http://www.paho.org/english/PED/antiterrorism.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
204. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (showing that the United
States began to prepare for bioterrorism and chemical terrorism in 1995 following
the Tokyo subway chemical attack, and increased its efforts and resources for
responding after the bioterrorist attacks in the United States in 2001).
205. See, e.g., Dolmo, supra note 30, at 142-43 (stating that the U.S.
government and the pharmaceutical industry did not cooperate with the South
African government's efforts to address its HIV/AIDS epidemic for two years and
only agreed to negotiate after feeling public and political pressure); see also, e.g.,
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interest groups to convince the U.S. authorities to permit the use of
compulsory licenses for alleviating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, even
while thousands of infected people worldwide were dying of
AIDS.2 °6 House Bill 3235 provides an implementation mechanism
that would expedite the process of providing humanitarian assistance
to poor countries experiencing health emergencies.2 7 Clearly, the
Secretary of HHS may still be reluctant to issue compulsory licenses
due to pressure from the pharmaceutical industry. 20 8 However, the
media, the public, public health interest groups, and some politicians
would also likely exert pressure on the Secretary, compelling him to
exercise his authority under House Bill 3235.29
Furthermore, the passage of House Bill 3235 would serve the best
interests of American citizens living abroad in a country targeted for
super-terrorism.2 0 If a foreign country has an inadequate supply of
medicines, American lives could depend on the availability of drugs
exported from the United States. 21 ' The U.S. government has an
Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 112 (alleging that the U.S. government allied
itself with the pharmaceutical industry to protect patent rights rather than public
health, even when American lives were at risk during the Cipro patent dispute).
206. See Gathii, supra note 18, at 733 (reporting that, by 1999, at least fifteen
million Africans had died of AIDS, even though AIDS can be treated with a
combination of drugs).
207. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (proposing that the
provision for exports of medicines in House Bill 3235 would allow the United
States to rush medicines to a foreign country during a public health emergency
generated by an act of biological warfare).
208. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 143 (discussing the pharmaceutical industry's
powerful influence on U.S. trade policies with respect to patent rights).
209. See id. at 143-44 (noting that public pressure, together with successful
lobbying efforts by public health and consumer rights interest groups, influenced
U.S. officials to change the trade policy regarding the use of compulsory licensing
for HIV/AIDS drugs).
210. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (contending that House Bill
3235 could save the lives of many Americans living in developing countries with
inadequate access to pharmaceutical drugs).
211. See id. (reasoning that under House Bill 3235, the Secretary of HHS could
authorize generic manufacturers in the United States to produce and export
patented medicines to countries in which American lives may be at risk in a public
health crisis).
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obligation to aid American citizens living on foreign soil.212
However, without the export provision of House Bill 3235, the U.S.
government does not have an adequate legislative vehicle to ensure
that Americans in foreign countries receive supplies of antibiotics for
treatment against exposure to biological or chemical agents.2 13
The United States also needs the proposed compulsory licensing
bills to provide clarity as to the remuneration entitlements of patent
holders who do not authorize the government's licensing of their
patents.2"4 Presently, the United States may issue compulsory
licenses for patents to address public health concerns under its
eminent domain authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.15 However, section
1498 is an inadequate provision for compulsory licensing because it
does not provide a legal framework for determining the royalty fees
to which patent holders are entitled for the use of their patents.21 6 The
212. See Madeleine K. Albright, Countering Terrorism Abroad, in SUPER
TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 113 (stating that the United States must provide the
best security possible to U.S. citizens living all around the world, even to
diplomatic personnel, who according to international law are legally under the
protection of their host countries).
213. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (implying that the
export of patented medicines is discouraged under the current U.S. patent regime).
214. See infra notes 215-20 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
under current U.S. law regarding compensation for the issuance of a compulsory
license law and the need to address them in order to increase access to essential
medicines in case of a public health emergency).
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994) (permitting the federal government to use
or license a patent without the authorization of the patent owner); see also
Memorandum from Al Engelberg, former U.S. Justice Department attorney, to
Senator Charles Schumer (explaining, with reference to Cipro, that the government
may assert the same defenses to the patent infringement allegation that are
available to a private party, i.e., the patent is invalid, not infringed, or
unenforceable), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001 -
October/002105.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
216. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Sherrod Brown, GOP Bioterrorism
Plan Neglects Key Points (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter GOP Bioterrorism Plan]
(commenting that the Bush Administration would not invoke its eminent domain
authority to override Bayer's patent for Cipro because the amount of compensation
to be decided later by a judge may be too high, and contending that House Bill
3235 has an administrative compensation process that would eliminate that
element of uncertainty), available at
http://www.house.gov/sherrodbrown/bioterror 1115.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2002).
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statute allows patent owners to sue the government for compensation
for patent infringement, but only after the government issues a
compulsory license. 7  Consequently, since the amount of
compensation is unclear at the outset, a judicial holding could subject
the government to high compensatory liability.218  The
unpredictability of this compensation process under 28 U.S.C. §
1498 deters the use of compulsory licensing.2 9 House Bills 1708 and
3235 would mitigate this problem by providing clear criteria for an
administrative determination of reasonable compensation at the time
of the licensing.220
Under the remuneration provisions of the bills, public officials
would determine a "reasonable" remuneration for use of a patent
based on numerous factors.22 Among the factors to consider are the
risks and costs associated with the R&D of the product, the degree of
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (granting a patent owner the right to sue the
government for the non-voluntary use of its patent and receive compensation in an
amount determined by a judge). But see W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)
prevents a patent holder from enjoining a compulsory licensee from selling the
patented product to the federal government and from suing the licensee for patent
infringement).
218. See GOP Bioterrorism Plan, supra note 216 (stating that Secretary
Thompson of HHS argued against invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to override Bayer's
patent on Cipro because the amount of damages for which the government would
be liable could be too excessive).
219. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (fearing that the
uncertainty surrounding the compensation issue for compulsory licensing under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 influenced the U.S. government's reluctance to use compulsory
licensing to obtain an adequate stockpile of Cipro).
220. See H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(d) (2001) (providing a list of considerations for the
Secretary of HHS and the FTC to evaluate the "reasonableness of ... the
remuneration" to be paid to a patent owner for the authorized use of its patent); see
also H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(b) (2001) (granting the Secretary of HHS the right to
determine "reasonable remuneration for use of the patent"); see also CPT's
Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (stating that "HR 3235 is needed to
introduce more predictability and certainty in the compensation process, so that
public health officials can act fast and confidently, to address a crisis as it
happens").
221. See H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(d) (listing six factors to consider in determining
remuneration for the compulsory licensing of a patent); see also H.R. 3235, sec.
2(a)(b) (enumerating nine factors that the Secretary of HHS may take into account
when determining a reasonable compensation amount to a patent holder for the
unauthorized use of its patent).
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importance of the invention to public health, the degree to which the
government funded the research and development of the invention,
and the public health benefits arising from increased access to the
product.2 2 In stark contrast, the amount of damages under the current
compensation system of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 may be based on the
financial loss of the patent owner resulting from the compulsory
license.223 Under this formula, the government could end up paying
the same amount as it would have originally paid for the brand-name
drug before issuing the compulsory license, and additionally, it
would incur legal expenses from the litigation.224 This result would
defeat the purpose of the compulsory license, which is to increase the
availability of essential drugs at a reasonable cost.225
2. Impact on R&D of Pharmaceutical Products that Combat Super-
Terrorism
Compulsory licensing legislation in the United States would not
hinder the pharmaceutical industry's ability to develop new
medicines that counter biological or chemical agents.226 The
222. H.R. 1708, sec. 2(a)(d); H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(b); see also Mokhiber &
Weissman, supra note 112 (discussing the compensation criteria of House Bill
3235).
223. See Correa, supra note 145, sec. 3.1 (explaining that remuneration under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 may be based on the amount of loss incurred by the patent owner,
not the amount gained by the licensee); see also, e.g., Leesona Corp. v. U.S., 599
F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (holding that in an eminent domain case, the proper
measure of damages is "what the owner has lost, not what the taker has gained").
224. See Todd Zwillich, Bill Would Allow Emergency Bypass of Drug Patents,
REUTERS, Nov. 8, 2001 (reporting that supporters of House Bill 3235 claim that
under the current system, a potential suit for patent infringement against the
government could be very costly to the government), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-helath/200 1 -November/002366.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2002).
225. See id. (indicating that the compensation process of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
frustrates the purpose of compulsory licenses).
226. See Dolmo, supra note 30, at 160-61 (presenting the microeconomic theory
that compulsory licensing will increase drug sales when prices decrease, and
therefore compulsory licensing does not harm sales revenue to the extent that drug
industries contend); see also Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132
(noting that drug companies whose patents are under compulsory licenses would
still reap the financial rewards of marketing their products first, and would be
entitled to royalties from generic producers); Mdecins Sans Fronti~res, MSF
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pharmaceutical industry and other opponents of compulsory
licensing allege that revenue from drug sales is necessary to maintain
investments and recoup R&D costs. 227 The occasional use of
compulsory licensing by the government, however, would not likely
dissuade investors from participating in a highly lucrative industry.228
Even if private investments in the industry decrease slightly, it would
not drastically affect R&D financing.229 Pharmaceutical companies
finance less than half of the R&D for new products. 230 The majority
of R&D funding comes from American tax dollars, private
foundations, and state and local governments. 23 I Also, the companies
receive generous tax breaks on their portion of the R&D
expenditure.232 Moreover, the government offers drug companies
Response to 'Boys from Brazil' (asserting that "[w]ith Africa accounting for only
one percent of drug sales, it is ludicrous to suggest that the use of generics in
Africa diminishes the economic incentive for multinationals to conduct research"),
at http://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?articleid=826FCC89-E I EC-4E25-
99DE3E9BB3FAC3D7 (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
227. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 2469 (discussing developed countries'
argument that investors would consider the pharmaceutical industry a risky
investment because compulsory licensing would preclude drug companies from
recovering their R&D expenditures).
228. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (highlighting the
fact that profits in the pharmaceutical industry are at least five percent higher than
profits in any other industry and will increase by sixteen to eighteen percent over
the next four years); see also U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS 104 (1993)
(finding that, throughout the 1980s, the net returns on pharmaceutical R&D well
exceeded the cost of capital investments, including the time and risks incurred by
investors), avaiable at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/diskl/1993/9336_n.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2002).
229. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (indicating that
compulsory licensing would not impair R&D capabilities of drug companies
because a large proportion of R&D is subsidized through non-industry funding).
230. See id. (presenting data that show drug companies contribute less than half
of the overall pharmaceutical R&D expenditures in the United States).
23 1. See id. (stating that taxpayers fund forty-two percent of pharmaceutical
R&D, while other non-pharmaceutical sources generate eleven percent of R&D
financing).
232. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, Rx R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG
INDUSTRY'S R&D "SCARE CARD" ii [hereinafter RX R&D MYTHS] (highlighting
that in addition to obtaining federal funding, pharmaceutical companies receive tax
advantages for conducting research and developing new drugs), available at
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additional financial incentives for testing the safety of drugs for
children.233
The enactment of House Bill 1708 would ensure that drug prices
accurately reflect the costs incurred by drug companies for R&D. 34
Section 3 of the bill requires pharmaceutical companies to provide
the Secretary of HHS with annual disclosure of their audited
financial information relating to the pricing of their drugs.235 The
Secretary evaluates the pricing schemes based on the reported cost of
R&D for a specific drug, as well as overall R&D activities. 236 This
financial reporting system is the best challenge to the industry's
persistent claim that compulsory licensing inhibits R&D of future
medical inventions. 237
http://www.citizen.org/publications/print-release.cfm?ID=7065 (last visited Sept.
5, 2002).
233. See id. (noting that as a result of the "pediatric exclusivity" incentive for
testing the effects of drugs on children, the drug industry generates an additional
$600 million in profits per year, while incurring costs of less than $100 million a
year).
234. See H.R. 1708, sec. 3(a) (mandating that drug companies submit annual
financial reports to the Secretary of HHS). The Secretary may penalize any drug
company that fails to meet the reporting requirement by assessing a maximum fine
of $25,000 for each day that passes the reporting deadline, but only after the
Secretary provides a written notice of delinquency and gives the company an
opportunity to request a judicial hearing. See id. sec. 3(b)(1) - (2); see also
Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (urging that it is time to hold
the pharmaceutical companies accountable for their drug pricing and purported
expenses).
235. See H.R. 1708 sec. 3(a) (requiring a financial report from drug companies
disclosing costs associated with the research and development of a new drug and
costs allocated to all research and development activities of the company).
236. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (expressing the
importance of a reporting system that would allow authorities to ascertain the true
costs incurred by the pharmaceutical industry).
237. Compare Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, Health Care Advocates to Fight Efforts by Generic Industry to
Jeopardize the Progress in Medical Research (Feb. 25, 2002) (claiming that any
attempt to weaken the patent protections under the current law will harm research
efforts for new drugs), available at
http://www.phrma.org/press/newsreleases//2002-02-25.347.phtml (last visited
Sept. 5, 2002) with Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (challenging
the pharmaceutical industry's assertion that drug companies could not produce new
drugs if the government institutes compulsory licensing laws).
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Given the ongoing tension between the pharmaceutical industry
and developed countries on one side, and developing countries on the
other side, the following section suggests ways in which the WTO
and the Unites States can alleviate some of the problems associated
with the compulsory licensing debate. 238  The international
community must take immediate steps to address this issue before
the use of biological and chemical agents becomes a prevalent means
of global terrorism. 23 9
JII.RECOMMENDATIONS
Compulsory licensing is an essential legal and legislative tool in
the fight against global super-terrorism. 24 ° The U.S. opposition to
compulsory licensing permits pharmaceutical companies to profit
from bioterrorism, 24I and poses an unacceptable health risk to
populations exposed to biological or chemical agents.242 In light of
the effects of globalization, the United States and other developed
countries cannot afford to ignore global health concerns. 243 A large-
scale super-terrorist attack on any country would result in
238. See discussion infra Part III (proposing various proactive approaches that
the WTO and the United States should adopt to facilitate the use of compulsory
licensing).
239. See id. (urging prompt action by the WTO and the United States in
establishing clear guidelines and new policies regarding compulsory licensing for
national public health emergencies).
240. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (indicating that it
would be unconscionable for the United States to fail to aid developing nations
suffering from biological or chemical attacks).
241. See CPT's Letter to Secretary Thompson, supra note 111 (warning that the
U.S. government has an obligation to prevent pharmaceutical companies from
exploiting the state of panic and urgency resulting from bioterrorist attacks); see,
e.g., Keith Bradsher, A Nation Challenged: The Treatment; Bayer Halves Price for
Cipro, But Rivals Offer Drugs Free, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al available at
WL 29615551 (suggesting that Bayer stands to make large profits from the sale of
Cipro even after negotiating a price reduction with public health officials).
242. See CPT's Letter to Secretary Thompson, supra note 111 (purporting that
the government's policy on compulsory licensing is endangering the lives of U.S.
citizens); see also, Mokhiber & Weissman, supra note 112 (advocating the
prioritization of public health concerns over corporate profiteering).
243. See Global Health Core Messages, supra note 8 (submitting that the United
States' best interests are served through global good health).
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devastating human loss and would create regional or global panic,
with rippling effects on the global economy.244 Accordingly, the
WTO must add breadth to the compulsory licensing provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement. 245 Also, the U.S. government must facilitate the
use of compulsory licensing by addressing concerns regarding
remuneration to patent holders and the effects of compulsory
licensing on research and development. 246 This policy shift would
recognize the need to assist the developing world during health
emergencies, particularly those arising from the acts of super-
terrorism. 2 47
A. THE WTO MUST RECOGNIZE ITS MEMBERS' RIGHT TO OBTAIN
COMPULSORY LICENSED PRODUCTS FROM FOREIGN MARKETS
In the event of a biological or chemical disaster, developing
countries that lack the capacity to manufacture essential drugs must
be able to exercise their legitimate right to use compulsory licensing
without the fear of economic or legal reprisal from developed
countries.2 48 The WTO must acknowledge this right by adopting an
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that protects public health.2 49
244. See SIMON, supra note 2, at 8-9 (writing that terrorists use biological and
chemical agents to create public fear and panic, and sabotage the economy); see
also Global Health Core Messages, supra note 8 (stating that "[h]ealth is vital to
social and economic development and to global political stability").
245. See discussion infra Part III.A (recommending that the WTO recognize its
Members' right to obtain compulsory licensed products from foreign markets).
246. See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.C (recommending that the United
States take actions in support of compulsory licensing).
247. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (urging the United States to
adopt a pro-public health position that would allow developing countries to meet
their citizens' health needs).
248. See Joint Statement, supra note 68 (interpreting the Doha Declaration as a
political victory for developing countries that were apprehensive about legal
repercussions of using compulsory licensing, because it declares that the TRIPS
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner to protect
public health).
249. See Doha Declaration, supra note 150, para. 6 (recognizing the problems in
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, but deferring on an interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement as to the issue of where countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity for pharmaceuticals will obtain medicines under a
compulsory license); see also CPT's Comments Presented at the WHO/WTO Joint
Secretariat Workshop, supra note 145 (stating that, "We have to begin to think
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In the Doha Declaration, the WTO Ministers instructed the TRIPS
Council to find a solution to the problem arising from the inadequate
manufacturing capacity of some developing nations.25 ° As an integral
part of the solution, the Council must allow countries to either (1)
grant a compulsory license to a generic drug manufacturer in a
foreign market under Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement,25' or (2)
import medicines that are the product of a compulsory license issued
by the exporting country-as permitted under House Bill 3235.252 A
contrary interpretation would simply defeat the fundamental purpose
and premise of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,
that is, increasing global access to life-saving drugs.253 Without a
proper implementation mechanism for compulsory licensing, the
TRIPS Agreement offers empty benefits to poor countries in dire
need of affordable drugs.254
Although the WTO could permit Members to issue compulsory
licenses under either Article 30 or Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement, it is more feasible to employ Article 3 1(0.255 Since
about pro-active globalization initiatives to address the needs to the public,
including the poor, rather than the needs of firms that are global").
250. See Doha Declaration, supra note 150, para. 6 (requiring the TRIPS
Council to find a solution before the end of 2002).
251. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (imploring the United States
and the WTO to interpret Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement in a manner that
would allow a WTO Member country to grant a compulsory license to foreign
manufacturers).
252. See Joint Letter to the TRIPS Council, supra note 201 (urging the WTO to
adopt an interpretation of Article 30 that would permit WTO Members to export
drugs to countries that lack capacities for local manufacturing of pharmaceutical
products).
253. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 16 (recognizing a frustration of purpose of
allowing compulsory licensing under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement if poor
countries cannot address public interests because they lack the technological
capacities to manufacture pharmaceutical products).
254. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (highlighting that flaws in the
text of Article 3 1(f) of the TRIPS Agreement preclude most developing countries
from implementing compulsory licensing laws).
255. See WTO, TRIPS Council Secretariat, Communication from the United
States Regarding Paragraph 6 qf the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, IP/C/W/340 (Mar. 14, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. Communication
to the TRIPS Council] (indicating that the United States would not concede to
employing Article 30 as a possible solution for addressing the difficulty that poor
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Article 31 is the technical provision that authorizes compulsory
licensing, it contains various terms and conditions that grant some
protection to patent holders. 256 For instance, under Article 31, a
compulsory license expires when the circumstances requiring it cease
to exist, and the licensee must pay the patent holder "adequate
remuneration" for the license.257 On the other hand, Article 30 does
not offer such specific protections to patentees.258 Consequently,
developed countries are more likely to oppose the use of this
provision as the basis for permitting compulsory licensing for
exports. 259 These countries, however, may be more receptive to a
broad interpretation of Article 31(f), whereby a WTO Member can
export medicines under a compulsory license to a Member that lacks
or has an insufficient manufacturing capacity for pharmaceuticals.26 °
The enactment of House Bill 3235 would be significant for the
development of a WTO resolution regarding the scope of
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. 6 In the past, the
U.S. government acted strategically to prevent the WTO from
adopting a flexible interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement by
exerting economic and political pressure on developing countries.262
countries have in using the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement).
256. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 60, Part II, sec. 5, art. 31 (providing
twelve conditions under which WTO Members can issue a compulsory license).
257. See id. art. 31(g)-(h) (taking into consideration the interests of patent
owners).
258. See id. art. 30 (stating in general terms that the limited exception to patent
rights must not "unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
[must not] unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner").
259. See U.S. Communication to the TRIPS Council, supra note 255 (rejecting
the proposal that Article 30 could be interpreted to allow exceptions to patent
rights for export of medicines because doing so would "seriously prejudice the
rights and obligations of Members under the TRIPS Agreement").
260. See id. (exploring the potential of Article 31(f) as the legal basis for
allowing Members to issue compulsory licenses).
261. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 3-4 (discussing the influential role of the
United States in TRIPS negotiations); see also, e.g., Carroll, supra note 29, at 2440
(examining the influence of U.S. patent law on international developments in the
biotech industry).
262. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 12 (stating that despite the United States'
public endorsement of the need to address global public health issues, trade
representatives continue to exert political and economic pressures on developing
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It is time for the United States to reverse its policy.263 In light of the
recent anthrax attacks in the United States and the potential for
greater harm from biological or chemical warfare, the United States
must acknowledge the importance of global cooperation and
worldwide access to counterterrorism antibiotics. 264 Congress should
pass House Bill 3235 to clearly indicate the United States' support
for allowing exports of medicines to address public health crises in
developing countries.265
B. THE UNITED STATES MUST FACILITATE THE REMUNERATION
PROCESS OF COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER U.S. LAW
The recent controversy over the potential compulsory licensing of
the Cipro patent demonstrates that Congress must amend U.S. patent
law to incorporate compulsory licensing provisions.266 The Cipro
countries that advocate for a liberal interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement); see
also Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (criticizing the U.S. government's
strategy of proposing language at TRIPS conferences that appears to benefit the
poorer countries, but which would actually restrict protections for public interests
and advance the interests of pharmaceutical companies).
263. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (accusing the U.S. government
of harming foreign relations and its own standing in the international community
through its abuse of power with regard to intellectual property issues).
264. See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Draft
Declaration on TRIPS and Health Highlights Divisions in the WTO, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 30, 2001 (quoting Justin Forsyth, Oxfam GB
Policy Director as saying, "We had hoped that the issue of access to the patented
anti-Anthrax drug, Cipro, would make rich country governments more sensitive to
the needs in developing countries ... But the latest reports from the WTO in
Geneva indicate that the US has not budged an inch"), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/01-10-30/story2.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2002); see
also, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Anthrax Scare
Draws New Focus on JPRs and Access to Medicines, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE
NEWS DIG., Oct. 23, 2001 [hereinafter Anthrax Scare] (quoting Paulo Teixeira,
Director of the Brazilian government's AIDS program as saying, "The anthrax
outbreak is very distressing but I hope it will make [the United States and Canada]
reflect more about our position that compulsory licensing is an entirely legitimate
instrument if there is a problem of access to a crucial drug"), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/O1 - 10-23/story2.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
265. See Anthrax Scare, supra note 264 (urging the USTR to take the lead in
changing trade policy to reflect public interest rather than the interests of large
pharmaceutical companies and lobbyists).
266. See GOP Bioterrorism Plan, supra note 216 (stating that the anthrax attacks
and the subsequent dispute over the Cipro patent demonstrates the need for a
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dispute indicates that the uncertainty over amounts of compensation
to be paid to patent holders may be a factor in the U.S. government's
reluctance to use compulsory licensing. 67 As long as government
officials are uncomfortable with allowing courts, to determine the
government's liability for issuing compulsory licenses under 28
U.S.C. § 1498, they will continue to choose the conservative
approach of avoiding the use of compulsory licensing to eliminate
the risk of liability.268
Congress should enact House Bills 1708 and 3235 to address the
concerns regarding compensation for the non-voluntary use of a
patent.269 The administrative compensation process proposed in the
bills should mitigate the fear of exposing the government to future
litigation and liability upon the issuance of compulsory licenses. 7 °
The factors enumerated in the bills for determining compensation to
statutory basis for compulsory licensing other than eminent domain authority to
effectively address the threat of bioterrorism).
267. See Other Anthrax Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001 (publishing a letter
from Bernard A. Schwetz, the Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner of the Food
and Drug Administration, in which he defends the Bush Administration's decision
to not exercise its eminent domain authority to override the Cipro patent because
"if the government overrode the patent, Bayer could bill the Treasury for lost
revenues"); see also CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184, paras. 2-3
(asserting that Secretary Thompson's reluctance to obtain essential antibiotics
through compulsory licensing, simply because damage payments for patent
infringement could be expensive, will subject the public to higher health risks).
268. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184, para. 3 (fearing that
"[b]ureaucrats will cut comers with the public health" due to concerns about
unpredictable liability costs).
269. See GOP Bioterrorism Plan, supra note 216 (arguing that House Bills 1708
and 3235 would prevent extensive litigation and unnecessary costs that could
otherwise arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
270. Regarding the Bush Administration's plan to address bioterrorism,
Congressman Brown stated in his address to Secretary Tommy Thompson of HHS
and Director Jeffrey Koplan of the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention:
The spread of anthrax has already taken a significant toll on the nation's sense
of security. Unencumbered access to drugs is an essential element in our
response to bioterrorism. Establishing the statutory and regulatory framework
now to secure generic drugs on an expedited and affordable basis simply
makes sense. Taking that step now will help ensure that the priority of doing
what's best for the public is not subsumed by cost concerns, red tape, or legal
haggling. I'd like to work with you to ensure you have this [sic] compulsory
licensing tool available to you before another 'Cipro situation' arises.
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patentees are fairly comprehensive and should generate reasonable
royalty fees. 27 The remuneration provisions, however, should also
include such considerations as the domestic market share for the
licensed product, general royalty rates in the pharmaceutical sector,
and royalty rates that licensees would pay for a voluntary license of
the product.27 2 This administrative procedure will allow public
officials to act more promptly and decisively in issuing compulsory
licenses, which would be particularly important in the aftermath of a
biological or chemical attack.273 It would permit the government to
immediately increase the production and distribution of generic
drugs in times of national and international public health disasters.274
C. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD AGGRESSIVELY ADDRESS
PURPORTED R&D CONCERNS THAT IMPEDE COMPULSORY
LICENSING
The most practical challenge to the pharmaceutical industry's
claim that compulsory licensing impedes R&D is to implement a
system by which officials can scrutinize the R&D records of
pharmaceutical companies.275 At present, the government does not
271. See H.R. 1708, sec. (2)(a)(d) (listing such factors as the costs of R&D, the
importance of the product to public health, the amount of public funding received
for R&D, the need for providing incentives for new inventions, public interest
considerations, and public health benefits from increased access to the product);
see also H.R. 3235 sec. 2(a)(b) (listing the same five factors as H.R. 1708 and
including additional factors, such as the benefits of increased availability of the
product to working families and retired persons, and the need to remedy anti-
competitive behavior).
272. See Correa, supra note 145, ch. X, sec. 3.1 (discussing various methods
used by U.S. federal courts for determining "reasonable" royalty rates).
273. See GOP Bioterrorism Plan, supra note 216 (noting that the rapid
availability of therapeutic drugs is essential to saving thousands of lives in the
event of a release of a biological agent like anthrax).
274. See CPT's Comments on H.R. 3235, supra note 184 (emphasizing that
legislation providing more predictability in the compensation process of
compulsory licensing would facilitate the government's ability to address both
domestic and foreign public health emergencies as they arise).
275. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (arguing that a
requirement that pharmaceutical companies provide audited, detailed information
regarding their expenses is a necessary component of challenging the industry's
threat that drug companies will cease to produce new drugs if legislators compel
price reductions for marketed drugs); see also Rx R&D MYTHS, supra note 232, at
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attempt to verify or explore the industry's claim that drug prices
merely reflect the high risks and costs associated with R&D.276 The
pharmaceutical industry has refused for years to disclose its R&D
records to congressional investigators and independent auditors.277
Nevertheless, the drug companies still receive substantial
governmental subsidies, generous tax incentives, and other financial
incentives to engage in R&D of new pharmaceutical products.278
Section 3 of House Bill 1708 would be an effective legal tool for
exposing the true costs incurred by the drug companies, since it
requires both the Secretary of HHS and Congress to review the
financial reports submitted by the companies. 279 The financial
reporting requirements of the bill are also useful to the authorities in
determining whether a patent holder is engaging in monopolistic
23-24 (advocating for the disclosure to Congress of R&D costs by the drug
industry).
276. See Why Do Medicines Cost So Much?, supra note 36 (alleging that R&D
costs for each new drug brought to the market total on average $500 million). But
see Rx R&D MYTHS, supra note 232, at ii (exposing the falsehoods of the
industry's claims by scrutinizing government studies, companies' financial filings
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and other documents obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act). In the 1990s, the actual after-tax R&D
costs for each new drug ranged from $57 million to $71 million, not $500 million.
Id. Also, pharmaceutical R&D is not as risky as the industry claims, given the fact
that only twenty-two percent of the new drugs on the market over the past two
decades were actually innovative rather than mere replicas of existing drugs. Id.
277. See Rx R&D MYTHS, supra note 232, at ii (noting that the pharmaceutical
industry won a nine-year legal battle to limit the ability of congressional
investigators from the General Accounting Office to review the industry's R&D
records). Although Congress has the authority to subpoena the industry's R&D
records, it has never invoked that authority. Id. Congress' failure to act may be
attributed to the fact that the pharmaceutical industry makes generous financial
contributions to political campaigns. Id. For example, in 1999-2000, the
pharmaceutical industry spent $262 million on federal lobbying, campaign
contributions, and "issue" advertisements for candidates. Id.
278. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (criticizing the fact
that prescription drug prices are soaring, even though the drug industry receives
tax breaks, and is well-funded by taxpayers, private foundations, state and local
governments, and other non-industry sources); see also RX R&D MYTHS, supra
note 232, at ii (recognizing that the federal government provides various financial
incentives to drug companies in connection with their R&D activities, and arguing
that R&D risks and costs are significantly reduced by taxpayer-funded research).
279. See H.R. 1708, sec. 3(a) (mandating that drug companies submit annual
audited financial reports related to drug pricing to the Secretary of HHS, who
would provide a copy of the reports to Congress).
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practices (i.e., excessive pricing) and whether compulsory licensing
is a proper remedial course of action.280
Some commentators argue that drug companies still rely heavily
on revenue from products they have already placed on the market in
order to cover their half of the R&D budget.28' The industry,
however, could clearly compensate for lower sales revenues by
curtailing certain expenditures.282 Drug companies allocate exorbitant
sums of money for inordinate expenses, such as generous employee
compensation packages, marketing, and advertising.283 The ability to
incur expenses of such magnitude casts doubt on the assertion that
pharmaceutical companies cannot afford lost revenues because it
would reduce their R&D capacities.284 House Bill 1708 should serve
as a mechanism to regulate private drug companies by subjecting
their financial reports to scrutiny by the Secretary of HHS and
280. See id. sec. 2(b)(3) (providing that anti-competitive conduct by a patent
holder could subject the patent of products at issue to compulsory licensing); see
also Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (accusing the drug industry
of price-gouging).
281. See Litovsky, supra note 127, at 22 (arguing that despite government
funding, drug companies need to raise sufficient revenue from drug sales to cover
total R&D costs). Commentators reason that the introduction of lower-priced
products in the marketplace through compulsory licensing would lead to fewer
sales for patent holders and lower profits for investors. Id. Commentators argue
that reduced earnings would have adverse consequences on R&D financing by the
patent holding drug companies. Id.
282. See, e.g., Rx R&D MYTHS, supra note 232, at 20 (attributing an increase in
drug prices to increased advertising since 1997). But cf Fisch, supra note 39, at
311 (arguing that cutting back on pharmaceutical drug advertisements would harm
patient care because the advertisements inform patients about a potential treatment
and encourage them to contact a physician).
283. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (illustrating that
drug companies allocate excessive amounts of money to non-essential expenses).
For example, in 2000, Bristol-Myers Squibb dispensed $1.2 million for the CEO's
salary, $1.9 million for his bonuses, and $30.4 million in stock options. Id.
Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies spent $8.3 billion in 2000 for marketing
and advertising. Id.
284. Compare Litovsky, supra note 127, at 22 (alleging that increasing
competition in the generic drug market will discourage private investments and
will significantly reduce the R&D budgets of brand-name drug companies) with
Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (arguing that brand-name drug
companies must account for all their expenditures if they continue to maintain that
high drug prices are necessary to cover their R&D expenditures).
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Congress.2 5 Consequently, drug company executives may adopt a
more conservative fiscal policy with regard to their expenses.286 Such
curtailed expenditures, coupled with the availability of public
funding for R&D, would limit the effect of compulsory licensing on
the total R&D budget for future pharmaceutical innovations.287
D. COMPULSORY LICENSING LEGISLATION is NEEDED TO
FACILITATE GLOBAL PREPAREDNESS FOR SUPER-TERRORISM
The U.S. Congress should pass compulsory licensing legislation in
order to demonstrate a willingness to provide humanitarian aid and
international cooperation during a foreign public health crisis.288
Although the world has not yet witnessed a major bioterrorism or
chemical terrorism incident, super-terrorism is a global threat and
warrants global preparation. 289 National security is clearly a priority
for the Bush Administration, which has initiated domestic
285. See H.R. 1708, sec. 3(a) (requiring pharmaceutical companies to submit
annual financial reports on drug costs and sales to the Secretary of HHS).
286. See Statement of Congressman Brown, supra note 132 (supporting the
notion that drug companies should account for their expenses).
287. Cf Rx R&D MYTHS, supra note 232, at 20 (contrasting the expenditures on
marketing and administrative costs-thirty percent of revenue, by Fortune 500
drug companies in 2000-with the expenditure on research and development-
twelve percent of revenue).
288. See Albright, supra note 212, at 110 (acknowledging that the United States
must assist foreign nations that are victimized or threatened by terror, and stating
that "[i]t is not enough for Americans to be concerned only about attacks against
Americans").
289. See Pan American Health Organization ("PAHO"), Latin America,
Caribbean Urged to Plan for Bioterrorism (reporting that experts on bioterrorism
and emergency response who met at a PAHO conference after the bioterrorist
attacks in the United States urged Latin American and Caribbean countries to
prepare to respond to bioterrorism), at
http://www.paho.org/English/DPI/pr01026.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). At a
meeting of Health ministers from the Americas at PAHO, U.S. Secretary of HHS
Thompson stated:
Given the evolving opportunities and the reality of an uncertain future, we
must work together if we really want to make a difference .... Although each
country has a responsibility to meet the health needs of its people, there are
few issues countries working alone can fully resolve. The need to build
partnerships and alliances has never been more compelling.
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preparedness programs to prevent and respond to bioterrorism and
chemical terrorism.2 9° However, it is insufficient for the United
States to adopt an isolationist attitude towards health.291 Super-
terrorism requires global preparedness because it has significant
international repercussions.292 A healthy population is a vital aspect
of any country's economic welfare, since the loss of human capital
reduces the country's labor and intellectual workforce. 293 Also, the
economic shortfall resulting from an emerging public health crisis in
developing countries has detrimental effects on international trade
and global markets. 94
290. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Secretary Thompson Testifies on HHS Readiness and Role of Vaccine Research
and Development (Oct. 23, 2001) (noting that following the anthrax attacks in
October 2001, the Bush Administration requested $1.2 billion for production of
vaccines and antibiotics and $643 million for expansion of the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011023.html (last visited Sept. 5,
2002).
291. See Global Health Core Messages, supra note 8 (acknowledging that
American health and economic prosperity is "inextricably linked" to the health of
the world population and the prosperity of its trading partners); see also PAHO,
supra note 289 (reporting that experts on bioterrorism and emergency response at
the PAHO conference noted that "[g]iven the global economy, an outbreak
anywhere in the world may be considered a threat to virtually all nations").
292. See American Medical Association, AMA Urges Global Ban of Biological
Weapon Development (warning that exposure to a communicable biological agent
anywhere in the world would have global health repercussions due to globalization
and the ease and frequency of travel), at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/article/2403-5338.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002); see also
Symposium, Bioterrorism: Homeland Defense Symposium: The Next Steps, Threat
Panel (Feb. 8, 2000) (analyzing the destabilizing effects of agriculture bioterrorism
(i.e., animal and crop disease from exposure to biological agents) on global public
health, political and social welfare, and the economy), available at
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/bioterr/chalk.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
293. See Global Health Core Messages, supra note 8 (noting that there is a
critical link between healthy individual growth and the development of intellectual
capital of a nation, and that intellectual capital is a universal currency).
294. See id. (stating that "[h]ealthy populations and healthy economies are vital
for a healthy world economy and strong markets").
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Compulsory licensing is an important component of global
preparedness. 295 If a developing country falls prey to super-terrorism,
it would need medical assistance to treat its infected population with
antibiotics.296 The international community, and especially the
United States-the largest source for pharmaceutical products-has
a moral and ethical obligation to provide affordable therapeutic drugs
to developing countries that do not have the resources to combat
super-terrorism. 297 The failure to act when thousands of lives are at
risk is unacceptable.298 Consequently, the export provision of House
Bill 3235 is particularly crucial in light of the potential for
alarmingly high mortality rates from biological or chemical
terrorism.299
CONCLUSION
The increased threat of bioterrorism since September 11, 2001,
refocused the attention of the international community on the need to
address problems in the compulsory licensing provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement.300 In this new era of super-terrorism, compulsory
295. See GOP Bioterrorism Plan, supra note 216 (declaring that the U.S.
government should have compulsory licensing legislation before the occurrence of
another bioterrorism incident).
296. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 12-13 (explaining that for poor countries with
inadequate local manufacturing capacities, the only means of gaining access to
essential drugs is through importation).
297. See Letter to USTR Zoellick, supra note 52 (indicating that the U.S.
government should provide humanitarian aid to a foreign nation facing a public
health emergency).
298. See Gilmore, supra note 2, at 15 (finding that the release of 1,000
kilograms of the nerve gas Sarin in open air would kill approximately 10,000
people); see also Federation of American Scientists, Biological Warfare Agents
(reporting that one hundred kilograms of anthrax "released from a low-flying
aircraft over a large city on a clear, clam night, could kill one to three million
people"), at http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/agent.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2002).
299. See H.R. 3235, sec. 2(a)(c) (establishing an administrative authority with
power to issue a compulsory license for exportation of generic medicines to a
country with urgent public health needs).
300. See Anthrax Scare, supra note 264 (observing that Canada's decision to
issue a compulsory license for Cipro and the United States' consideration of
purchasing generic versions of the antibiotic rekindled debates on the issues of
compulsory licensing and access to essential medicines).
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licensing is an essential legal mechanism for saving thousands of
lives.30' It is imperative that the WTO and the TRIPS Council
continue to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a way that supports the
protection of public health and implements the Doha Declaration in
good faith.30 2 Also, the United States must cease its abuse of
economic power to influence the TRIPS negotiations.3 3 It is time for
the United States to recognize that a change in its patent protection
policy is necessary to mitigate the threat of biological or chemical
terrorism on public health. The adoption of compulsory licensing
legislation in the United States would be a monumental step toward
facilitating access to life-saving medicines in a time of national or
foreign public health crisis resulting from super-terrorism.3 °4
301. See GOP Bioterrorism Plan, supra note 216 (indicating that compulsory
licensing is an essential counterterrorism tool).
302. See Doha Declaration, supra note 150, para. 4 (containing a promise and an
obligation to interpret and implement the TRIPS Agreement in a manner
supporting the right to protect public health and promote universal access to
medicines).
303. See Abbott, supra note 42, at 12 (stating that the U.S. representative to the
TRIPS Council continues to exert pressures against a flexible interpretation of the
TRIPS Agreement, while the USTR continues to threaten developing countries
with trade sanctions).
304. See discussion supra Part ill.D (demonstrating that the United States must
adopt a more lenient posture on the issue of compulsory licensing to show its
support for international cooperation in the fight against super-terrorism).
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